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Abstract 
This study explores two intertwined stages: a) the various processes contributing to 
Turkey’s and Israel’s historical development of national self-images and security 
cultures, b) how these conflictual dynamics and processes playing themselves out 
vis-à-vis two key conflict resolution initiatives taken in both countries. In order to 
study these stages, ontological security theory is applied to grasp: a) the impact of 
the psychological driving forces in the shaping of Turkish and Israeli national 
identities and security routines, b) and the leverages of these historically shaped 
notions on Turkey’s and Israel’s preferred conflict resolution agendas and mistrust 
perception towards the minorities, namely Kurds and Palestinians. In doing so, 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis method is employed to deconstruct the 
Turkish and Israeli policymakers’ contextual fixations of the key signs, e.g., 
Turkishness and Israeliness, through the legal frameworks, national security 
articles and military laws shaping the very rationale and logic behind their prevalent 
mistrust of the Other. Put otherwise, drawing on the ontological security 
perspective, this thesis initially investigates Turkey’s and Israel’s nation-building 
processes as well as experienced internal clashes contributing to the mistrust 
formation; and explore their interactions with the first conflict resolution attempts. 
Then, it examines Turkey’s and Israel’s relatively successful second conflict 
resolution plans through a trust-building framework incorporated into the 
ontological security lexicon, i.e. strategic communication. The purpose is to further 
identify the plans’ shortcomings in order to proffer an alternative outlook for future 
peace projects.  
Keywords: ontological security theory, nation-building, security culture, mistrust 
formation, strategic communication, Turkey, Israel. 
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1.   Introduction  
 
 
1.1. Disposition  
The development of new schools of thought on security studies since the end of the 
Cold War has attracted growing scholarly attention, heralding a new era in which 
experts discuss “broadening” the security agenda in the form of changing the 
referent objects of security and moving toward studying the discursive foundations 
of friend-enemy construction. Acknowledging the role of ethno-religious minorities 
in shaping the nation state’s security culture, it is no wonder that the concept of 
national identity has often explored in the scope of political clashes between the 
majority and the stereotyped Other. In contrast, states’ historical formation of 
domestic narratives and security routines, against the backdrop of their 
psychological engagements with conflict resolutions, has until recently attracted 
less attention. Moreover, as of writing this thesis, the growing scholarship has 
exclusively dealt with the translation of the national self into internal clashes within 
the context of narrow conflict resolution strategies — that merit the physical 
security. In comparison with this rather weak conflict resolution agenda, which is 
still under the influence of the orthodox security theories, the psychological 
linchpins of states, such as collective memory, fear and trust have often been 
overlooked. However, incorporating these main pillars into a conflict analysis 
offers a different and, I would say, novel approach in studying today’s Turkey and 
Israel. Both countries were founded on unsubstantial democratic backdrops with a 
deep-seated military tutelage and experienced devastating Independence Wars. 
Therefore, Turkey and Israel have shaped the siege mentality over time, which has 
pertinently formed the alarmist self-image becoming the major impetus of their 
security cultures. This attitude has firmly limited the reflexes of the Turkish and 
Israeli policymakers and methods they applied while settling the internal unrests 
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with the Kurdish and Palestinian communities. The ruling authorities, which are 
represented by Turkey’s AKP and Israel’s 25th and 28th governments, designed two 
conflict resolution strategies in order to reach a sustainable socio-political 
atmosphere. In doing so, they endeavoured to revise the two countries’ traditional 
security cultures to the accommodative model. Nevertheless, the long-standing war 
model policy against the ethnic turmoils and lack of trust of the Other incapacitated 
their peace plans. This comparative study of Turkey and Israel has revealed many 
aspects that mistrust, as the major issue behind their conflict resolution breakdowns, 
is the common phenomenon not only among the two governments but also the 
societies involved in the peace processes. Through applying ontological security 
theory and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis method, I first tease out the 
historical backdrop of this mistrust and explain the resolution failures of Turkey 
and Israel. I then evaluate their comparably effective second resolution attempts via 
alternative trust-building framework, strategic communication, which aims at 
providing roadmap to reconcile the negative emotional dynamics while assisting 
peaceful settlement. 
 
1.2. Research Questions and Aim of the Thesis   
As indicated above, my comparative research of Turkey and Israel principally 
focuses on two intertwined stages — investigating the formation of Turkish and 
Israeli national identities in light of their interactions with the first conflict 
resolution processes; then, more specifically evaluate their second resolution 
attempts through applying strategic communication framework. The findings serve 
the two-fold aim of this research. First, I attempt to analyse the early nation-building 
processes of both countries and their experienced internal clashes underpinning the 
state and societal levels of ontological security in terms of a mistrust of the Other. 
I compare the driving forces of these developments, being domestic narratives and 
legal frameworks, and examine their psychological impacts on the security culture 
formation. The findings of the comparative study are then used to explicate the 
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relationship between the routinized state behaviours and their leverages on the trust 
formation influencing the conflict resolution awareness of both societies. Second, I 
anticipate that this comparative research helps my thesis analyse how different 
social groups derive a sense of ontological (in)security from the constructions of 
national and group narratives. Considering the empirical findings, I argue that the 
underlying miscalculations of Turkey and Israel’s first conflict resolution attempts 
were their vague structures, abrupt implementations and top-down-orchestrated 
clandestine natures which failed to reshape existing mistrust into a sustainable 
track. Based on these, I further explore their relatively successful second conflict 
resolution plans through trust-building framework incorporated into the ontological 
security lexicon which identifies the plans’ shortcomings and delivers an alternative 
outlook for future attempts. 
With regards to these aims, I define two research questions be answered within this 
thesis:  
1.   In which ways can the formation of Turkish and Israeli national 
identities and their translations into civil conflicts be investigated 
through an ontological security perspective?  
2.   Pertinently, how can strategic communication play a key role in 
settling the ontologically insecure atmosphere? 
 
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured into several chapters. After the introduction, I provide a 
theory chapter. Since this thesis is a predominantly theory-driven research and 
strives to introduce a new approach, strategic communication, to the ontological 
security literature, the theory chapter is relatively long compared to the following 
methodology part. Therefore, the theory chapter is divided into various subsections. 
Against this backdrop, I briefly discuss the concepts of security and conflict, assess 
the new security schools’ potential contributions to my thesis and explain why 
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ontological security offers a suitable framework for this thesis. In the last subsection 
of the theory chapter, I propose my trust-building framework of strategic 
communication and highlight its relevance for the conflict resolution projects. On 
the grounds of this chapter, I offer the third chapter, which introduces my method 
and sources, explaining how this thesis utilises Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
analysis method to deconstruct the Turkish and Israeli policymakers’ contextual 
“fixations” of some keywords through the legal frameworks, national security 
articles and military laws. Based on my empirical findings, I open up my fourth and 
fifth chapters where I evaluate my case studies of Turkey and Israel by 
contemplating their nation-building processes, formations of security cultures and 
past conflict resolution attempts. These do not only analyse the relationship 
between the early state experiences and routines but also their interactions with the 
conflict resolution agendas. Then, the sixth and last chapter offers a concluding 
discussion that digests this comparative research of Turkey and Israel.  
 
1.4   Relevance and Limitations                   
Last but not least, I feel obliged to underscore the relevant aspects and limitations 
of this thesis. To start with, this research is a timely and valid project since 
ontological security remains an uncharted framework albeit there being some 
scholarly works implementing the theory in reading the Turkish (Rumelili, 2014; 
Zarakol, 2010) and Israeli (Lupovici, 2011; 2015) socio-political developments. I 
explain the scope of these existing researches in the following theory section. 
Furthermore, analyses of Turkish and Israeli ontological security from a nation-
building perspective are so far completely absent. While stressing this absence 
within the field, this thesis seeks to approach the collapsing peace initiatives of 
Turkey and Israel from a different angle. Although a limited number of human-
centric researches are carried out on the Turkish (Rumelili, 2015; Başer and Çelik, 
2014; Ulusoy, 2007; Aydinli and Ozcan, 2011) and Israeli (Peleg and Waxman, 
2007; Cohen-Almagor, 2012; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010; Lupovici, 2015) conflict 
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resolution agendas, there has been an ever-thickening literature relying on 
materially-motivated goals which have been sought to describe the failures as part 
of the physical security needs of Turkey and Israel. Therefore, psychological 
dynamics of the resolution processes are neglected. To conclude, this thesis takes 
up the notion of mistrust, which has not received sufficient attention in the 
ontological security literature and proposes a novel framework, being strategic 
communication.  
For the limitation part, it should be mentioned that although this thesis benefits from 
some general concepts of the conflict resolution field such as peacebuilding and 
reconciliation, it primarily aims to contribute to the burgeoning ontological security 
literature. Therefore, empirically speaking, the primary and secondary data are 
employed accordingly. Other limitations are associated with the framework of 
ontological security in terms of the agent-structure dilemma that manifests itself in 
this work as the intertwined relationship between the state and society. As I explain 
in the theory part of this thesis, analysing a society level ontological security allows 
researchers to see its extension over a state level. Considering this assumption as 
my point of origin, I apply ontological security theory in two ways when dealing 
with my case studies. Thus, while doing this research, I have struggled with the 
agent-structure puzzle and have aimed to clarify their impacts on each other in 
several ways.  
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2.   Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.1. Security and Violent Conflicts 
Why do civil conflicts occur? What are the driving forces behind them? Is achieving 
a permanent peace possible after a long-lasting conflict? How can routinized 
conflict policies and deeply entrenched mistrust of the Other which catalyse such 
conflicts be transformed? In theory and practice, governments, academia, and 
practitioners across the globe have been endeavouring to propose solutions to these 
challenging questions for decades. Although an immense amount of resources is 
being devoted to sustainable peace agendas, many long-lasting conflicts remain 
unsolved. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program report, (Harbom et al. 
2006) more than 40 percent of the conflicts which reached peace agreements 
between 1989 and 2005 have returned to violent means within the next five years. 
The complexity of internal struggles makes the cases even more challenging in 
order to recognise the reasons behind why some peace processes have not achieved 
sustainable grounds, while others have albeit limited in numbers. As this thesis 
primarily seeks to understand the background of unsuccessful conflict resolution 
attempts of Turkey and Israel while looking at the importance of cognitive and 
emotional dynamics sustaining the intergroup violence, the theoretical dialogue 
focuses on the concept of security in the first place. Therefore, there is a need to ask 
how various thinkers and security schools approach conflict? It is, furthermore, 
significant to discuss their positions and potential contributions to conflict 
prevention agenda.  
“Conflict precedes conflict resolution”, argues Wallensteen (2007, p. 13). 
Undeniably, there are valuable analyses regarding the origins of international and 
intergroup conflicts. On one hand, in the classic Eastern literature, Sun Tzu’s The 
Art of War, Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah and Yusuf Has Hacib’s Kutadgu Bilig can 
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be evaluated as the central pieces emphasising war strategies and survival during 
international conflicts. These thinkers did not only explain the nature of early 
conflicts but also proposed the preliminary versions of the concepts we now adopt 
to construe the structure of the social. For instance, Khaldun’s understanding of 
“social conflict” and “cohesion” influenced many intellectuals such as Durkheim, 
Reinaud, and Montagne in the development stage of modern sociology (Hannoum, 
2003). On the other hand, in the Western sphere, Clausewitz’s On War and 
Machiavelli’s Dell'arte della guerra anchored the premises of classical realism and 
what we interpret as traditional security in today’s political science (POLS) and 
international relations (IR) scope.  
 
2.2.   Genesis of the Post-Cold War Security Schools 
In contemporary academia, especially after the collapse of the bipolar world system 
in 1991, a concept of security and conventional attachments to the notion have 
started to be challenged and refined. This broad discussion has resulted in the 
formation of various security schools. Falling under this category, one group of 
academics calling themselves “critical theorists” point to the declining sovereignty 
of a state and switch the referent object of security from state to agent (human) and 
many sectors (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Critical security theorists develop diverse 
perspectives, which have later been recognised as Paris, Third World, Aberystwyth, 
and Copenhagen Security Schools. Both considering the impact factors they have 
and this dissertation’s research aim, contributions of the last two Schools to the 
security field are noteworthy. 
To briefly state, the Aberystwyth School, which was established on the works of 
Booth (1991) and Jones (1995), incorporates the Frankfurt School’s critical social 
theory into the security field. With the Frankfurt School tradition in mind, this new 
approach is founded on a human emancipatory security understanding. Copenhagen 
School of Security (CSS), however, forms its security outlook in a different way. 
Rather than relying on the agent-centric aim of the Aberystwyth School, the CSS is 
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motivated to examine (de)securitization processes of the diverse sectors such as 
environment, health, economy and etc. In so doing, the CSS concentrates on the 
security concept itself and its framing through speech act, linguistic usage, and 
media coverage. They situate the securitization theory at the heart of their analysis 
in surveying presentations of the cases and objects as existential threats that need 
to be addressed immediately (Buzan et al., 1998). Rejecting these two Schools’ 
arguments, another group of academics, who are recognized as “traditional security 
scholars”, claim that the field of security and conflict must be restricted to war, 
survival strategies and the control of hard power (Walt, 1991; Ayoob, 1991). 
Predictably, their disapproval towards human-based and broadening critical 
security schools locates them on a state-centric position in analysing the conflicts. 
This limitation, however, has rendered them to stick to the assumptions of the neo-
realist school, which often promotes positivist instruments to justify empirical data. 
Therefore, one may logically claim that “seeing is believing” constitutes an 
ontological basis for traditional security scholars (Chalmers, 1999, p. 4).  
There is no doubt that defining, limiting and reshaping the concept of security is a 
matter of puzzle “because no neutral definition is possible” (Smith, 2005, p. 27). 
Although a fixed definition is neither essential nor possible to describe the concept, 
I argue that security disputes and conflicts, which are violent extensions of these 
disagreements, can be classified as socio-psychological processes because conflicts 
are built on adverse emotional dynamics related to stereotyping and othering. This 
is the reason why fear and mistrust-driven conflicts, represented as the Turkey’s 
Kurdish and Israel’s Palestinian disagreements, cannot be directly reviewed 
through material examination or “seeing”. Nonetheless, the abstract dimensions of 
these struggles such as religion, culture, ethnicity and being a community have been 
experienced and have impacted on how the confrontation between state and the 
Other has thus far divulged. Hence, traditional security scholars have limited 
contribution to this thesis because not only would the key concepts be established 
on a diametrically opposite foundation but also the research concerns. Critical 
security schools, however, can have a substantial influence on this work, 
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acknowledging the CSS’s securitization theory and Aberystwyth School’s 
normative guidance. On the one hand, the CSS can help my analysis to focus on the 
“othering policies” and desecuritization attempts of the conflicts during the 
transformation phases. On the other hand, my work can benefit from the 
emancipatory standpoint of the Aberystwyth School while surveying the revisions 
of security cultures from a war model to an accommodative one.  
This research, however, delves into an often-neglected aspect of the ontological 
security of states and individuals during conflict resolutions — that is a mistrust 
formation. As one of the core questions of this thesis, a strategy of trust-building 
which help antagonistic parties reach a sustainable peace has received little 
attention compared to other notions being discussed within the ontological security 
literature. Instead, much more effort is allocated to the study of anxiety during 
conflict resolutions (Rumelili, 2015; Lupovici, 2015; Çelik, 2015). Despite the fact 
that these studies offer enlightening perspectives on the function of psychology 
towards violent conflicts, they are mostly limited in scope and exceedingly 
descriptive when addressing the narrow needs of society. It is, therefore, the 
assumption of this thesis that trust-building is a profoundly efficient mechanism in 
leading to peaceful resolutions after long-lasting conflicts, which should be further 
investigated and practised. Within the realm of the trust-building canvass, this 
research aims at filling the research gaps in the ontological security and conflict 
resolution fields by identifying, conceptualising and empirically engaging with a 
type of framework not previously dealt with— Strategic communication. Prior to 
introducing the proposed notion, an overarching theoretical framework of this 
thesis, ontological security, should be elaborated. 
 
2.3. Why Ontological Security?  
As declared above, the development of contending theories of international security 
studies since the end of the Cold War has triggered scholarly debates about 
“broadening” the security agenda and themes in terms of changing the referent 
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objects of security and studying the discursive and visual construction of the friend-
enemy binary. With regard to the academic brainstorm, the psychological 
importance of the Other during the group and state construction processes has 
gained a ground (Campbell, 1999). In this respect, state identity is associated with 
a set of principles and routines that do not only reformulate state relations but also 
draw a line between a state and the Other (Buzan and Hansen, 2009), which can be 
echoed in diverse ways as I explore in the following chapters, e.g., mistrustful 
Other, reactionist Other, antagonist Other and etc. Following this, a new approach 
investigating states’ motivations to protect their distinctive self-images is 
introduced to the security studies besides the physical understanding of the security: 
…scholars routinely assume that states seek physical security, which upon 
close inspection is no less problematic than ontological security. Physical 
security-seeking assumes that states have something like ‘bodies’ that can die. 
What exactly is the state’s body? Territory? True, like the body, the state’s 
territory gives it a spatial boundary; but certain body parts are essential to 
human functioning — brain, heart, etc. — whereas it is not obvious that any 
particular piece of the state is similarly essential (Mitzen, 2006a, p. 351). 
In line with Mitzen’s assertion, most IR theories concede that states primarily seek 
to protect their physical security as raison d’état in achieving their goals (Waltz, 
1979) because “unless men enjoy some measure of security against the threat of 
death…they are not able to devote energy or attention enough to other objects to be 
able to accomplish them” (Bull, 1977, p. 5). It is true that states need to ensure their 
physical existence, which is closely linked to their soil and borderlines defining it. 
Nonetheless, a number of IR theories also stress that states must have “human 
needs” beyond the basic urge of survival because the same approaches embrace 
some type of “humanly” expressions that function at a state level. Thus, the physical 
existence of states is not the only source of security they seek to protect. There is 
another source driving them to be consistent and stable, that is: ontological security 
(Huysmans, 1998; McSweeney, 1999; Kinnvall, 2004).   
Coined by Laing (1960) and further developed by Giddens (1991), ontological 
security refers to “the need to experience oneself as a whole, the continuous person 
in time — as being rather than constantly changing — in order to realize a sense of 
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agency” (Mitzen, 2006a, p. 342). To put it differently, regardless of individuals or 
states, all beings can only exercise their agency if they form a stable way to exist 
because the very entities need to feel secure in who they are through experiencing 
their externalised identities and self-narratives (ibid). As a vital point, expressing 
the being or self requires a certain emotional environment which enables actors to 
systematically relate their means to ends. In the same manner as with individuals, 
states also strive to construct cognitively unique identities through establishing 
behavioural routines, which are interlocked with their self-narratives (Giddens, 
1991). In doing so, they overcome “fundamental existential questions” (ibid, p. 47). 
To recapitulate, established routines facilitate agents to eradicate radical 
uncertainties challenging emotional and cognitive realms where actors practice 
their sense of agency, or in other words, their sense of unique identities.  
In this respect, a question mark arises. How do they manage to establish their 
identities in relation to ontological security? There are three different arguments 
concentrating on the issue. First of all, Steele (2008) puts forward that a state’s 
ontological security is entrenched in its self-image, which is internally shaped. In 
other words, a state forms a self-identity by itself; then, engages its interstate 
relations by applying this imaginary profile. The second assumption, in comparison, 
offers a relational perspective. According to Mitzen (2006a), a state’s identity is not 
formed by itself but it is constructed through dynamic interactions with significant 
others. From this point of view, an identity of a state or a sense of self must only be 
constituted in light of the relationships established among varied actors. The third 
and last evaluation, which this thesis applies, while answering the ways in which 
the formation of Turkish and Israeli national identities are decoded into the conflict 
resolutions, suggests that internalized self-narratives can never be separated from a 
constructed relationship with the significant Other because a self is responsive to 
newly formed inter‐personal affairs (Kinnvall, 2004). 
While devising a state’s self-image, whether one reckons the intrinsic model or 
Kinnvall’s approach, it is a common understanding that the main purpose of a 
routinized behaviour is to utilise a stable identity. However, experiencing a stable 
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self requires an actor to show biographical continuity (Kinnvall and Mitzen, 2017). 
In this regard, an agent’s actions are expected to either constantly imitate an existing 
identity or oppose it (Mitzen, 2006a). Because identity prompts behavioural 
patterns, its permanence over time is closely tied to being supported by an actor’s 
practices. This is the reason that even detrimental and self-defeating relationships 
may provide a stable identity pattern in tracking ontological security (Rumelili, 
2015). Thus, states may prefer to pursue ongoing conﬂicts rather than experiencing 
an unsettling condition of deep uncertainty since conflicts put the ontological 
security of parties in a threatening position (Mitzen, 2006a), a position that exposes 
existential questions concerning one’s self-portrait vis-à-vis the Other (Williams, 
2003). 
Since routinized interactions also help agents stabilise their identities, one can 
safely contend that states may become attached to their routines and security 
practices regardless of their contents. Hence, long-lasting conflicts such as Indo-
Pakistani, Turkish-Kurdish, and Israeli-Palestinian can be viewed as ontological 
security determinants of these states. In this way, states may uphold socio-political 
construction of historical fears that enable them to create a network distinguishing 
allies from opponents (Kinnvall, 2004). This network regulates a state’s “moral 
standards” which are proposed as preconditions for the survival (Rumelili, 2015) 
—  that is steadily integrated into routinized security apparatuses. In practice, these 
moral standards authorise security actors of states to settle violent conflicts by 
employing hard power while legitimising their exceptional actions. Therefore, by 
referring to the moral standards as a point of origin, I argue that the security actors 
of Turkey and Israel have played a crucial role in the routinisation of states’ 
attitudes towards the internal conflicts.  
Having that said, a unique self-portrait of states can be challenged in critical 
situations such as conflicts, wars and peace processes where states’ stable identities 
and groups forming them may face potential changes (ibid). Although conflict 
resolution processes are intrinsically designed to mitigate security-oriented fears, 
these periods situate historically attached self-narratives and long-lasting habits of 
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states in an uncertain position because these transformation attempts may reveal 
ontological insecurity (ibid). As Kinnvall (2004, p. 746) argues it is an opposite 
situation of ontological security that is defined as a condition of general anxiety 
deriving from the interruption of habits and incapability to maintain a lucid 
narrative about “doing, acting, and being”. The sense of insecurity destabilises 
actors’ trust relations while underlining the potential threat which may come from 
the Other; therefore, force agents to pursue their tested practices. This perception, 
however, may pave the way for the “manipulation of this distrust by political actors, 
who act to re-channel this anxiety into specific and habituated fears” (Rumelili, 
2015, pp. 7-8). Concomitantly, as part the above-mentioned agent-structure shift, 
there is an imperative question begging to be asked: will this thesis concentrate on 
the ontological security of states or groups forming them? For Krolikowski (2008) 
and Chernobrov (2016), observing ontological insecurities of political agencies and 
state-level actors are challenging because these bodies do not confront with the 
fundamental insecurity conditions such as identity crisis and death. 
Notwithstanding, one may be able to spot this phenomenon through the bottom-up 
analysis. According to Steele (2008), analysing a society level ontological 
insecurity allows researchers to identify its extension over a state. Institutionally 
speaking, this assumption can be best observed in investigating the formation of an 
imagined community through the nation-state apparatuses (Anderson, 2006). Thus, 
ontological security seeking is inherently a double-edged process. Considering 
these as a point of departure, this thesis applies ontological security theory in two 
ways when analysing the case studies. Firstly, the constructions of Turkish and 
Israeli ontological security are examined against the backdrop of their early nation-
building processes. Secondly, the influence of established ontological security on 
the identity formation of various groups is investigated as a way to grasp why 
Turkish and Israeli ontological security negatively reacted against the conflict 
resolution attempts. This two-layer analysis supports my thesis to tease out in which 
ways the different ethnic groups derive their sense of ontological (in)security from 
the introduction of distinct national narratives that are shaped while addressing the 
physical needs of Turkey and Israel.  
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From a vantage point, in the Turkish and Israeli contexts, their early war traumas 
have formulated the detached mindset towards various ethno-religious identities 
that stimulated the two states pursuing the war model-driven security culture rather 
than implementing the population-centric approach. Although both countries have 
been trying to switch their attitudes since the early 1990s, their established state 
routines and security cultures made several conflict resolution attempts obsolete. 
As can be inferred from the arguments of Kinnvall (2004) and Rumelili (2015), 
Turkey and Israel stuck to their self-deteriorating but approved war model in 
solving the internal disputes rather than employing unproven methods. In this way, 
they also followed their historically shaped policy routines. 
I contend that the early Turkish and Israeli governments considered insurgency 
movements as existential risks to their newly formed states’ ontological security. 
Within this framework, any threatening ideologies such as the Kurdish and 
Palestinian nationalism were labelled as reactionist and authorised to be repressed 
by hard power. Accordingly, the Turkish and Israeli self-narratives have 
intentionally or unintentionally expelled these groups from their value systems 
because an identity building process is profoundly interrelated with the historically 
shaped inter‐group affairs (Kinnvall, 2004). In time, this sentiment has laid the 
foundation of piercing state reflexes while managing the domestic quarrels.  
 
2.3.1. Critics towards Ontological Security 
Critically assessing a state’s self-narrative attachment, Chernobrov (2016) argues 
that historically cultivated narratives of a majority vis-à-vis the Other often reflect 
a sense of superiority that may be recognised as a narcissistic self-defence 
mechanism. For Chernobrov, this puzzling structure may instinctively reproduce 
flawed dichotomies dividing the social sphere, for example, between virtuous-
dishonest and progressive-unmodern labels (ibid). He further disputes this 
narcissistic segregation by the Hegelian ethos of “the value that I am or that I 
‘represent’ (should) be the value desired by the other” that ontological security 
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scholars ought to reckon (ibid, p. 588). There are also deep disagreements among 
ontological security scholars on “whether the study of ontological security opens 
up or closes down the question of the subject in world politics” (Kinnvall and 
Mitzen, 2017, p. 6). In this vein, Rossdale (2015) criticises the above-mentioned 
ontological security-seeking argument of Kinnvall (2004). Rossdale claims that an 
ontologically insecure environment can only be transformed by radical political 
movements having potentials to forestall counterproductive imitations of tested but 
violent state routines, namely the national narratives (ibid). Taking an ethically-
motivated research as a point of departure, Rossdale underlines the continuity 
obscuration of ontological security. He challenges the assumption of ontological 
security that some state routines replicate unproductive violent instruments and 
privileged position of the ruling class which lead to exclusion of the Other (ibid). 
Alternatively, Rossdale proposes that a binary understanding of self, incoherent 
relationships with the Other and contradictory self-routines underscoring the 
opacity of the self (he quotes a queer identity) can draw a pattern for the “creative 
moments” for resistance against the historically dominant and delimiting 
ontological security of states (ibid, p. 379). He argues that by challenging social 
norms, binary codes and fixated reference points attached to the group narratives, 
militarised routine of the state may eventually dissolve (ibid). One may argue that 
his recommendations to resist state practices through unfitting and inconsistent 
ontological routines are exemplary for the literature in order to see the theory’s 
limits on the state routines. Nevertheless, I claim that his conceptualization of the 
creative moments for resistance reaches on the impasse in two ways. Firstly, 
although there are numerous alternative ontological security forms that individuals 
may adopt to resist states’ “militarised” routines, there are rigid limits while 
implementing the creative routines at a state level. In terms of swiftness, for 
instance, it is hardly possible to transform states’ ontological security parameters at 
a rate of individuals — that one may evaluate the most salient restriction against the 
state level creative moments as the hundreds of years old bureaucratic structures 
imposing hierarchies on states which slow down the decision-making processes 
(Strange, 1998; Trondal, 2011). As a second rebuke, it should be mentioned that, 
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apart from his resisting strategy, Rossdale fails to introduce a transformation 
agenda against the violent state routine and harsh security culture and his article 
leaves unanswered a much-desired question — how can we modify unproductive 
state routines? 
 
2.3.2. Transforming the Ontological Security Routines 
Getting caught in counterproductive routines does not mean that a state cannot 
succeed to remodel its security culture and established mistrust after a long-lasting 
conflict. As a corollary of the hypothesis that agents cannot cope with all dangers 
at once, transformation attempts highly depend on the “removal of some existential 
questions from the table” (Mitzen, 2006b, p. 273). In doing so, as the first and 
foremost step, states need to create the basic trust system. Giddens (1991) refers to 
this system as a cognitive cocoon that helps actors reframe certain opinions and 
resolve existential questions shaped by internal conflicts. Primarily, the cocoon 
notion can be evaluated as a defence mechanism of an agent, which is formed as a 
consequence of early experiences (ibid). In other words, the mechanism reflects an 
early pattern of state socialisation in terms of policy routes and preferred security 
agenda. While reshaping the cognitive cocoon, states must “break down the rigid 
attachment to routines and create routines of interaction that permit parties to reveal 
aspirations and learn from interactions” (Mitzen, 2006a, p. 363).  
As one may notice, interaction is outlined as a key concept to re-create an existing 
trust system which is informed with agents’ historically established security 
concerns and existential dilemmas. Nevertheless, how can a state planning to launch 
a conflict resolution model unfold this interaction? How can potential ontological 
insecurities of a transformation process be curtailed? According to Bar-Tal (2000), 
a long-lasting conflict can be understood as a psychological struggle that parties 
involved perceive as an intergroup zero-sum game. Needless to say, it should not 
mean that material bargaining during resolutions has no significance whatsoever; 
rather, it should be pushed onto the second place because only psycho-cultural 
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reconciliations alter societies’ fixation on mistrustfulness of the Other (ibid). 
Relating this, Bar-Tal (2000) also argues that societal resistance to change and 
peace agreements may be observed during conflict resolution processes. However, 
avoiding an interaction with the Other may culminate in a deadlock while searching 
for a sustainable peace environment as studied by the contact hypothesis (Allport, 
1958). This is the fact that only a limit number of peacebuilding initiatives reaching 
settled conditions between states and armed groups have survived because 
establishing a peace atmosphere needs to grasp local dynamics and everyday 
practices while creating mutual trust (Maoz, 2006). Therefore, I argue that while 
initiating conflict resolution processes with insurgency movements, intrastate 
groups must reach a trust consensus that enables states reshaping an existing 
cognitive cocoon. Having reached this consensus, states will realise that “security-
seeking is a social practice” (Mitzen, 2006a, p. 341). Against this theoretical 
backdrop, I further claim that the strategic communication concept leans itself well 
to cooperate with the cognitive cocoon in establishing a mutual understanding 
platform for citizens through the interactive environment it provides. Set against 
this background, one of the central concerns of ontological security is to investigate 
the narratives we tell ourselves and make sense of the cognitive reasons why 
individuals, groups and states experience insecurity and existential anxiety in the 
emotional nexus (Kinnvall and Mitzen, 2017). This is the impetus that prior to 
embracing the significance of the two concepts within the scope of this thesis, 
addressing the below question better guides the audience in the following 
discussion: Although associated with different realms, can a strategically designed 
tool be able to collaborate with the emotional field in relation to ontological 
(in)security?  
 
2.3.3. The Cognitive and Emotional Level Intersection 
Based on the Freudian analyses within social psychology, until recently, there has 
been a disposition among scholars to treat cognitive and emotional spheres as two 
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discrete subjects (Kleef and Fischer, 2015). In this debate, while cognitive actions 
of agents have been associated with the conscious and rational performances such 
as strategic thinking, reasoning, and remembering, the emotional sphere has mostly 
correlated with impulsive and uncontrollable feelings. Starting with the book of 
Ortony et al. (1988), the current scholarship concerning behavioural routines 
challenge orthodox approaches on the parallel systems of cognition and emotion. 
Concordantly, there are pioneering outcomes which may help ontological security 
researchers explore the interdependence of emotions, behaviour, trust and decision-
making process against the backdrop of political psychology. It is argued that 
inherently emotional impressions such as stereotypes and prejudices are embedded 
within the cognitive horizon that shape agents’ behavioural routines (Kaiser and 
Major, 2004) that are the toe-hold of ontological (in)security. In other words, 
inconsistent with the previously attached impulsive and abrupt characteristics, 
emotions are revealed as capable factors which may be found at the cognitive level, 
i.e. “strategically” motivated activities. Therefore, as cognitive actions have come 
to be understood within the socio-emotional dimension their dependence on the 
emotional sphere are appropriately explored (Storbeck and Clore, 2007). In this 
line, Oatley et al. (2011, p. 1342) argue that the former distinction between the 
emotional and cognitive patterns emanated from the lack of empirical research; 
however, it is now proved that “the core of the cognition is central to emotion” 
because we regulate our emotions in order to fit the social life. This elucidates how 
emotions facilitate the creation of new routines and different survival strategies as 
an effective cognitive mechanism (Kleef et al., 2011; Hess and Fischer, 2013). 
Therefore, emotions are able to critically approach an ontologically insecure 
situation and strategically prepare an appropriate course of action. This does not 
only clarify that emotions are rationally motivated dynamic structures but also 
demonstrate how historical fear conditioning may impose trust issues (Storbeck and 
Clore, 2007). The preceding explanations also confirm the hypothesis of Covington 
and Omelich (1988) that since the conflict psychology and anxiety of change enact 
the same area of the brain, it is possible to analyse the inseparable relation between 
emotions and cognitions. Seen in this light, the concepts of strategic communication 
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and cognitive cocoon work coherently in order to shift the anfractuous ontological 
trajectories that the conflict climates impose on agents. This process, however, 
fundamentally intends to re-decode the emotional domain, or “e-motion”, as 
Planalp (2009, p. 6) sets forth: “if we want to move people, we must study e-motion 
because it is pathos combined with logos and ethos that change people, for good or 
for ill” (ibid). With this objective, in the following section, I introduce strategic 
communication as a framework whose partial employment in Turkey’s and Israel’s 
second conflict resolution attempts comparatively mitigated the majorities’ 
ontological insecurities. I believe that it may serve as a catalyst for e-motion and 
offer a practical outline for future resolutions, if fully applied. 
 
2.4. Strategic Communication and Cognitive Cocoon 
Energising and remobilizing a society towards a shared problem entail an engaged 
public space where dialogues are embodied around a designated issue and work 
collectively to resolve it (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). Collaborating with this vision, 
Atashi (2009) and Coser (1967) argue that peace requires not only a top-down 
approach but also a bottom-up political communication because a transition from 
violence to reconciliation is often founded on a sustainable ground when the Other 
participates in a dialogue process. However, both scholars also admit that there is a 
little known about the effective peace strategies reinforcing such societal dynamics 
(ibid). In order to fill this gap within the literature, I propose the strategic 
communication framework as a practical strategy which may play a key role in 
revitalising a public sphere and motivate a society to work together in modifying 
mistrust narratives while initiating a conflict resolution with the armed groups 
associated with the Other.  
Mostly, while the strategy is known as architecting fast and effective methods in 
reaching pre-defined goals, communication is viewed as a transmitting process of 
a message through specific channels. Combining these two, strategic 
communication arises as a new public diplomacy tool in line with the paradigm 
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shift from the mechanistic monologue forms of communication to the complex and 
dialogical understanding (Klerk and Verlew, 2013). Its essence is to 
“communicating purposefully to advance its mission” (Hallahan et al., 2007, p. 4); 
therefore, the tool is designed to “increase stability and reduce uncertainty” (Klerk 
and Verlew, 2013, p. 364). In the emerging and converging communication field, 
strategic communication has most often been applied by private company studies 
concentrating on effective management, marketing and technical support (Hallahan 
et al., 2007). Nevertheless, Sandhu (2009) argues that as a young and promising 
discipline, strategic communication is applicable for explanatory methods and sub-
branches deriving from neighbouring disciplines which may well adopt the concept 
within their theoretical scope. Verifying this, the concept is recently associated with 
the conflict communication domain through incorporating the public relations and 
political diplomacy under a single roof as a corollary of multifaceted conflicts, e.g. 
the Iraqi War and intertribal struggles in the sub-Saharan Africa (Hallahan et al., 
2007; Pratt and Omenugha, 2014).  
The major characteristic differentiating strategic communication from other 
traditional methods is its modernist approach. Such an approach makes the concept 
suitable not only to spreading policy routes of governments but also for 
interactively engaging them through bottom-up approaches (Seidl, 2007), such as 
participation of civil society and high profile locals. Therefore, strategic 
communication supports an asymmetrical dialogue process in which many diverse 
voices and viewpoints are encouraged to solve a common disagreement (Ströh, 
2007). In this way, strategic communication uses an interactive model offering an 
opportunity to modify pre-established meanings, routines and narratives that 
rebuild shared reality through dialogue and the free flow of communication 
(Hallahan et al., 2007). According to Wang (2007), in doing so, strategic 
communication focuses on a single coordinated effort (e.g. mistrust transformation) 
in which all communication activities (e.g. civil society, locals, etc.) work together 
to create momentum. In a Habermasian way, the framework makes inroads for civil 
society to take a direct part in socio-political decision-making mechanism 
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(Habermas, 2006). Therefore, the overarching purpose of this process is to reach a 
common emotional and cognitive platform or consensus-building because strategic 
communication, in the first place, does not re-impose power structures but rather 
tries to assure a mutual understanding (Hallahan et al., 2007). In this sense, the 
notion should not be evaluated as a manipulative communication tool designed to 
distort existing opinions in the interest of states. Instead, it is essentially created as 
a trust-building framework between the groups because the technique offers a 
transparent, persistent, and effective dialogue process (Reding et al., 2010), which 
serves as a “common denominator” for the sides involved in this project (Tindall 
and Holtzhausen, 2011, p. 74).  
In this respect, society can achieve a mutual understanding, mitigate fear-driven 
prejudices, and create a common future vision through a well-designed interaction 
agenda. The above interpretations allow this thesis to explore the links between 
civil society, communication, and the political agenda in order to understand 
emotional and cognitive level changes. Accordingly, building on ontological 
security, my purpose is to implement the framework to study the second conflict 
resolution attempts of Israel and Turkey through questioning a) What were the 
fulfilled strategic communication assertions that alleviated the ontological 
insecurities of the Israeli and Turkish majority in relative terms and energised their 
socio-political environment to modify mistrustful cognitive cocoon? b) What were 
the unfulfilled strategic communication assertions made Turkey and Israel unable 
to remove some existential questions from the table and modify their historically 
built antagonism and mistrust towards the Other? 
For Giddens (1991), this antagonistic structure is closely related to the prejudice 
phenomenon originating from negative emotional experiences such as anger and 
hatred. He claims that prejudices that unavoidably impose mistrust emphasise the 
distinctive characteristics and behavioural routines of a group that are missing in 
the Other (ibid). This psychology, however, helps people maintain a stable identity 
and secure their unique self-values (ibid). Following this discussion, Giddens 
argues that a prejudice-driven identity formation can be modified in a healthy way 
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(ibid). In making that statement, it is fundamental to increase local ties and establish 
a clear information flow between the social groups that propagate trust while 
striking at the foundations of the negative relations (ibid). In the same manner, most 
conflict resolution researchers agree on the fact that the restoration of the majority-
Other relation is an imperative emotional component of the sustainable peace 
agenda (Rothstein, 1999; Mendeloff, 2004). To establish common terrains between 
this section and an ontological security framework, I maintain that the above-
mentioned agent-structure argument translates itself into the childhood era 
observations of Giddens. Hence, several IR scholars highlight that although states 
adopt antagonistic perceptions towards the Other as a result of their early clashes 
with them, the very states may also internally contest their existing behaviour in 
various ways (Huysmans, 1998; Lupovici, 2015). One can infer from this sub-
section that the implications of the cognitive cocoon and strategic communication 
approaches reach a critical crossroad in reading the circumstances that enable 
agents to modify their early mistrust formation. Thereby, their employment to the 
Turkish and Israeli conflict resolution contexts may investigate to what extent 
Turkey and Israel removed some existential questions from the table and managed 
to “break down the rigid attachment to (their) routines…and learn from 
interactions” (Mitzen, 2006a, p. 363).  
To recapitulate, failure to change the mistrustful cognitive cocoon formation has 
shattered the peace plans of Turkey and Israel twice. On the one hand, their first 
resolution plans, represented as the 2009 Kurdish Opening and the 1993 Oslo I 
Accords (hereafter Oslo Accords) were abruptly started as vague initiatives. Apart 
from their top-down and secretly carried nature, which isolated NGOs and local 
voices, they culminated in prevalent ontological insecurity in both majorities as 
public opinion polls have later presented. On the other hand, their second attempts, 
defined as the 2nd Kurdish Opening 2013-2015 and the 2003-2004 Roadmap for 
Peace, fulfilled several premises of strategic communication whose utilisation 
increased the public support by 30% for Turkey and 12% for Israel. The problematic 
part of the latter attempts, however, were the ignored premises of the strategic 
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communication (e.g., Israel’s top-down approach blocking local voices and 
Turkey’s yet unclear peace formula), which I explain in the concluding sections of 
the fourth and fifth chapters.  
As Mitzen argues: 
Practitioners more than theorists have stressed public sphere oriented 
strategies for preventing and ending conflict, and no clear theoretical 
justification has been provided. Ontological security provides that 
justification, and a framework for further research (2006a, p. 363). 
Set against this background, the assertions of strategic communication cooperate 
well with the ontological security theory that may help Israel and Turkey to settle 
their existing conﬂicts and enable them to acknowledge that mistrustful behaviours 
can be reshaped. Accordingly, one may raise a concern over the fact that to 
reformulate the state and social level mistrust, this thesis needs to grasp the 
reasoning behind these negative attitudes. It is, therefore, imperative to 
methodologically deconstruct the narratives and legal frameworks formulating the 
Turkish and Israeli national identities and observe their translations into civil 
conflicts. In this line, the ensuing chapter introduces an enlightening tool, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse analysis method, which decodes the driving motives of the 
Turkish and Israeli domestic narratives and legal frameworks in order to allow 
ontological security theory to track their psychological impacts on the security 
culture development as well as reading how various groups derive a sense of 
ontological (in)security from the constructions of these narratives. 
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3. Method and Sources 
 
 
3.1.  Discourse Analysis 
Do discourses have the ability to contour identity norms and state routines? Is 
Israeliness or Turkishness a constructed phenomenon? If so, how can we study the 
policymakers’ narratives and legal statements creating these structures and 
“fixating” our identities? Almost all distinguished scholars who have tried to shed 
light on the above inquiries have come up with their own paradigms. Foucault 
(1995) for example argues, on the one hand, that discourse is a powerful tool which 
constructs and deconstructs the truth. In this way, he continues, discursive actions 
facilitate ruling parties (or the hegemon) to spread their devised knowledge and 
alter the preceding attachments to any concepts. On the other hand, different from 
Foucault’s top-down understanding, Fairclough and Chouliaraki (1999) evaluate 
discourses as hybrid practices in which their meanings and purposes are always 
changing as a result of the dynamic social environment. As one may notice from 
this snapshot, perspectives on discourse analysis are wide-ranging. Concomitantly, 
each approach would offer unique methodological lenses in analysing the Turkish 
and Israeli national narratives and legal frameworks. Nevertheless, drawing on 
ontological security theory, I believe that their experienced state traumas, as 
embodied in harsh security cultures are well decoded through Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse analysis method. Since it provides a flexible deconstruction technique, 
which is particularly useful when it comes to examining the identity creation and 
political content analysis, their methodological tool allows this research to critically 
engage with the very rationale and logic behind the mistrust formation.  
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3.2.  Why Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Analysis 
Method 
The baseline of Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, which also lends itself well 
to be applied as a methodological framework, is a composition of post-Marxist 
schools of thought and post-Saussurian linguistics that Laclau and Mouffe merge 
into the same theory as they strive to explore social structures (Rear and Jones, 
2013). According to Laclau and Mouffe, all social actions can be perceived as 
discursive “signs” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). These signs constitute the 
“syntactic galaxy”, in which linguistic (speeches, articles, etc.) and non-linguistic 
practices (behaviours, emotional expressions, etc.) interrelate and engender a 
meaningful social sphere (Dabirimehr and Fatmi, 2014). Instead of relying on the 
Foucauldian methodology which analyses the discourse by deconstructing the 
entire text, their approach concentrates on the signs in explaining the direct 
relationship between the social sphere and power structures forming it (Jorgensen 
and Phillips, 2002). Therefore, for Laclau and Mouffe, discourse is not a 
consolidation of sentences but rather using a range of signs. These “signs acquire 
their meanings by being different from each other (e.g. a Turk sign is inclined to 
enjoy its unique identity by distinguishing itself from a Kurd sign in line with what 
Chernobrov argues above), but, in ongoing language use, we position the signs in 
different relations to one another so that they may acquire new meanings” (ibid, p. 
25). Hence, each sign can only be understood if evaluated within their specific 
historical contexts because in this way one may spot their constructed meanings and 
translations into actions. In this regard, the Turkish and Israeli legal frameworks 
and behavioural performances are to-the-point examples for observing some key 
signs, such as Jewishness, the Turkish nation, the promised land and their impact 
on the nation-building projects. In this vein, if the socio-political environment is put 
under the sign microscope, one may also recognise that language is a single fishing-
net constructed by the knots, namely words and performances (ibid, p. 26). At the 
centre of the fishing net, there is a central signifier which fixates the meanings of 
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the germane signifiers by categorically designating their boundaries (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1992). For instance, there are specific signifiers, such as Jewish ethnicity, 
Zionism and the Palestinian Other, associated with the Israeliness central signifier, 
which ascribe a special meaning to these signs. When viewed from this perspective, 
Laclau and Mouffe are inspired by Foucault’s understanding of power, meaning 
that political élites establish their influence through fabricating our social sphere 
point-by-point (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). Thus, the central concern behind 
Laclau and Mouffe’s methodological model of the signs and central signifiers is to 
deconstruct the existing socio-political matrix and remark its historical 
modification. While deconstructing the matrix, this thesis grasps the hegemon’s 
contextual usage of the discursive, behavioural signs and narratives in connection 
with their fixations through the public speeches, legal frameworks, national security 
articles and military laws. In the following phase, it teases out the fixated signifiers 
forming the self-defeating behavioural routines and mistrust; then motivates the 
strategic communication framework as a way to “resituate” these signifiers via a 
transparent dialogue process.  
 
3.3. Sources 
Prior to providing my sources, I need to clarify that this thesis, the analysis of the 
conflict resolution agenda of Turkey and Israel, is based on a comparative approach. 
I identify several variables — nation-building processes, security cultures and 
transitions attempts. Therefore, I select Turkey and Israel for the research in line 
with the “most alike nation-building and conflict resolution experiences with 
minorities in the Middle East”. To be precise, there is no doubt that the 
governmental structures of two states are different from each other: Turkey is a 
“Civil state” but Israel is a “Jewish and Democratic state”; the Turkish population 
is largely Muslim while the Israeli society is Jewish; the former was built on the 
“six-century-long Ottoman Empire”, heritage whereas the latter was once a 
“European minority” that is now the major ethno-religious group in Israel. The 
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study of the above-mentioned variables has uncovered noteworthy parallels 
between the two states that I further explain and use to depict the relationship of the 
early nation-building traumas and their impacts on the conflict resolution processes. 
Therefore, this thesis carries an interdisciplinary and qualitative nature that qualifies 
the research and benefits from a variety of resources. To a considerable extent, this 
thesis utilises secondary English, Turkish and Hebrew sources; academic articles 
and books focused on Israel and Turkey. Besides, primary sources such as Turkish 
and Israeli national circulations reflecting nationwide opinions and central thoughts 
of the two societies; official documents like the Constitution of Turkey and the 
Israeli Declaration of Independence; national security articles as Israeli military 
laws; public statements and speeches of the political leaders are also employed. Last 
of all, this work makes use of reports which are released by the civil society actors 
as NGOs and policy associations as ICG and ICP; public surveys conducted by the 
recognised polling organisations as the JMCC, JVL, KONDA and PSR. 
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4. Case Study Analysis: Turkey 
 
 
4.1.  From Empire to the Nation  
It is convenient to evaluate the transition of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire 
(hereafter occasionally referred to as “Empire”) into the secular nation-state, the 
Republic of Turkey, as the “progressive modernization process” (Bozdoğan and 
Kasaba, 1997, p. 3). The intellectual origins of this modern nation-state, however, 
go back to the mid-19th century. While attempting to restore its unproductive fiscal 
policies, the Empire appeared susceptible to the rapid rise of the nationalistic 
movement and; thus, it was seen as the “Sick Man of Europe”1. Concerned with this 
tumultuous atmosphere, nationalist intellectuals criticised the Empire for not 
embracing the values of the Turkish community and failing to protect their rights 
as a “founder ethnicity”. For Namık Kemal, mastermind of Turkish nationalism, 
the absence of the “motherland” idea among Ottoman rulers who were interested in 
preserving the “dynasty” rather than the “nation”, was the primary cause of the 
Empire’s anfractuous trajectory (1873). Another thinker, Ömer Seyfettin (1977, p. 
42), who later helped the Republican regime develop at Turkish identity, argued 
that “Ottomans hesitate to pronounce Turk, Turks, Turkishness and Turkey and they 
even get angry when someone voices these words”. Therefore, opposed to the 
Empire’s policies and seeking to underscore the preliminary versions of 
“Turkishness”, “Turkey” and “motherland” concepts, these intellectuals laid the 
politico-cultural foundations of the possible Turkish nation-state by “imagining the 
nation through printed media” (Akdeniz and Göker, 2011, p. 320). 
In a future sign of the deteriorating situation, the WWI erupted. Debilitated by the 
aforesaid issues, the Empire could not defend its territories while deploying troops 
                                                 
1 It refers to Ottomans’ financially and militarily weak era that is still utilized by Turkish 
policymakers to depict Europe’s longstanding perception. 
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on six fronts. At first, the Ottomans’ were forced to sign an armistice in 1918 and 
then the Sevrés Peace Treaty. I hereby explain the main articles of the treaty 
concerning the territorial partition. I, then, tease out the Articles 62 and 64 (designed 
to establish Kurdistan), which lays the foundation of Turkey’s mistrustful cognitive 
cocoon, in the following security culture section.  
According to the Articles 27, 36 and 94 of the Sevrés Treaty (Başkent University, 
2017), the Empire was to withdraw from all its territories and the remaining part 
(today’s Turkey) was divided into eight parts among the Entente States. Rejecting 
the treaty, former Ottoman officer and founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, and some high-ranking generals organised a local resistance; and 
transformed it into a full-scale war, known as Milli Mücadele. After three years of 
fighting against both external and internal rivals, Milli Mücadele accomplished its 
mission with the Loussane Peace Treaty in 1923 and the Republic of Turkey was 
established in the same year.  
According to Alaranta (2014, p. 18), while constructing the Republic, Atatürk 
“rejected the long-lasting universal context of Islam and replaced it with nation”. 
In line with inventors of the Turkish nationalism, Atatürk thought that instead of 
restoring the caliphate, a territorially defined modern nation state had to be formed. 
This was the primary purpose of the Kemalist Revolution that the constituent 
government would adopt a “secular justification for a national political community” 
(ibid), and fixate the meaning of religion by delineating its boundary as a non-
governmental sign. The second purpose of this policy was to nurture a national 
identity through clearly defined physical frontiers showing where Turks live (Ülken, 
1948). Prior to resituating the sign, nation (millet) was inferred to one’s religion, 
argues Aktürk (2008). Rather than adhering to the religious signs attached to millet, 
Atatürk switched the preceding signs and introduced the idea of the Turkish Nation 
(Türk Milleti); sharing the common nation, language and culture; and live in a 
defined and unitary soil (Mumcu, 1983). Constitutionally speaking, the transition 
from the Ottomans’ ümmet to the Republic’s millet is ensured by Article 2 of 1924 
Constitution which has ever since remained intact: 
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The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, étatist, secular and 
revolutionary. Its official language is Turkish and its capital is the city of 
Ankara (Peasless, 1956, p. 404). 
Three caveats merit attention insofar as the preceding Article is concerned. Firstly, 
the shifting of signs takes place in the form of transition from the Empire’s religious 
community outlook to the national one. Secondly, the article introduces a territorial 
definition, that is a capital, instead of reinstalling the Empire’s superficial border 
concept recognising all Muslims as its subject regardless of their origin. Thirdly 
and most importantly, Turkey describes itself as a nationalist entity that millet living 
in this Republic founds a core of the Turkish nation. It is based on this solid 
ideational ground that, millet is expected to speak Turkish if it is willing to instil 
and develop a sense of belonging. As described above, the discursive constructions 
of the nation-state are fundamentally designed to exercise progressive 
modernization. From this point of view, Turkish transformation bears striking 
similarities to Jacobins in French Revolution because Kemalism also aims to reform 
the society in light of the intellectual as well as tangible values of the West as 
Bozdoğan and Kasaba argue (1997). In this context, Atatürk proffered that the 
Empire’s archaic structure was to be blamed for Turkey’s noncivilized and 
underdeveloped condition: 
We lived through pain because we did not understand the conditions of the 
world. Our thinking and our mentality will have to become civilised… Take a 
look at the entire Turkish and Islamic world. Because they failed to adapt to 
the conditions and rise, they found themselves in such a catastrophe and 
suffering (cited by Bozdaglioglu, 2003, p. 52, emphasis added). 
Against this ideological backdrop, Atatürk tried to break down the old routines with 
the purpose of cultivating a novel agency for the Turkish nation. Nevertheless, since 
the signs of human progress of the Republic were fixated to a new and modern 
Turkish identity, Ottoman-associated traditional structures, state routines and 
beliefs such as religious orders and backward communities were distinguished as 
ontological insecurity sources against Turkey’s “civil” self-image. It must, 
however, be borne in mind that although Atatürk rejected the racial attachments on 
the millet argument by framing it as the upper identity of the nation-state, by virtue 
  
31 
 
of the experienced internal conflicts during the nation-building process, Turkish 
administrations have acknowledged ethnically diverse groups and religious factions 
as counter-revolutionists. Put differently, these communities are categorised as 
existential rivals of Turkey’s modernising identity pattern which strongly opposes 
the cultural conservatism of the former system. Hence, in the ensuing section, I 
explicate how experienced internal clashes with existential rivals form the mistrust-
driven security culture which in turn becomes a challenging element of the unique 
Turkish self. 
 
4.2.  Shaping the Security Culture  
For Deringil (1982), Turkey’s reflexive security culture is primarily formed as a 
corollary of the regional tensions during the World War II (WWII). Although I 
admit that the WWII atmosphere had catapulted Turkey’s alarmist security 
measures to a new height, Deringil’s premise is limited if one delves into the origins 
of this behaviour. Accordingly, I claim that Ottoman officers who later became 
influential figures in the Turkish administrations had already begun routinizing the 
security culture of the forthcoming Republic while settling insurgencies in the 
1920s. As shown above, the local resistance movement combatting the domestic 
and external adversaries was organised after the Sevrés Treaty whose Article 62 
obliged the Empire to accept a committee determining Kurdish territories which 
would later gain autonomy. Furthermore, if ever these autonomous entities wanted 
to secede, they would go to the League of Nations; and in the case of an agreement, 
“Mosul (has since then Iraqi territory) residents of Kurdistan would voluntarily join 
this independent Kurdish State without encountering any opposition from the 
Entente States” according to Article 64 (Başkent University, 2017, p. 22). 
Following the Sevrés, Kuva-yi Milliye, locally organised Turkish paramilitaries, 
suppressed fourteen ethno-religious uprisings; and the heads of the revolts were 
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sentenced to death for treason by the Independence Tribunals2. Among these, 
Koçgiri Rebellion, orchestrated by the British-backed Society for the Rise of 
Kurdistan and Milli Aşireti, French-backed Kurdish Rebellion, were the ones 
possessing huge grass-roots support. Having said this, one may ask as to whether 
or not Kuva-yi Milliye might have otherwise alleviated the hostilities by adopting a 
more restraint and compromising policy? On the one hand, with the full-scale war 
environment in mind, the question deserves a thorough investigation in another 
work. On the other hand, one may well observe the biographical continuity of this 
war-model paradigm after the WWI.  
After overcoming the Entente occupation, the Republican regime experienced 
seven more ethno-religious upheavals (four of them had Kurdish backgrounds) 
sharing the same pattern with the preceding conflicts. Instead of examining all, it is 
imperative to tease out the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), which was supported by 
the British mandate regime in Iraq to create a buffer zone Omissi (1990); that, as I 
read it, has firmly fixated the pre-existing modus operandi of Turkish security 
apparatuses. Although it fundamentally emerged as a counter-revolutionist 
movement demanding the re-establishment of the caliphate (Feroz, 1993); the 
rebellion also carried nationalistic elements as their leaders distanced themselves 
from nonaligned Kurdish tribes by counter-framing them as enemy soldiers and 
Turkish (Aybars, 1995). Firstly, Atatürk had already established the basis of the 
modern nation state. Hence, existential enemies jeopardising the nation’s fixated 
central signifiers, such as secular and civil agency, were to be countered and 
eliminated. Secondly, given that he and his political cadres had for several years 
served as military officers fighting against the Entente States and pre-republic 
revolts, one may reckon that their mistrust of the Other was deeply entrenched in 
and directly emanated from their physical and psychological war traumas before 
the Sheikh Said Rebellion. As the continuation of their tested and proved conflict 
resolution method, Independence Tribunals, which previously helped them defeat 
                                                 
2 These courts were actively used as an enforcement mechanism against counter revolutionists 
hampering the Milli Mücadele. 
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the Other, the new legislation, Law for the Maintenance of Public Order, passed 
from the national assembly: 
Organisations and religious orders supporting reactionist and insurgent 
movements…endangering the Turkish social order and peace; are thereupon 
authorised to be restrained by the Turkish government after President’s 
confirmation. Herein, the government will hand over those acting against 
these actions to the Independence Tribunals (TBMM, 2017, emphasis added). 
The Article cited above is crucially important. Not only does it reinforce Atatürk’s 
social order signs in conjunction with the Western values and non-conservatism 
(aka civil and secular agency), but it also distinguishes people who would pose a 
threat to this social matrix. In line with Rumelili’s moral standards argument 
(2015), Turkish modernization involves the implementation of a set of survival 
preconditions through taking necessary measures by security forces against 
reactionaries, namely Kurdish nationalists and Sharia supporters. Hence, one can 
argue that reactionist and insurgent movements are framed as not just physical 
security threats; but as major ontological insecurity sources. These almost 
routinized insurgency movements receiving foreign aid have formed a siege 
mentality, Sevresphobia, which is Turkey’s perception that there are forces 
constantly seeking to separate and destroy them (Akçam, 2004), structures and 
agents alike. It thus explains why Turkey’s national-self ostracises these 
communities from its ethos because the identity formation process is inextricably 
tied to the historically formed intergroup relations (Kinnvall, 2004).  
Fuelled by the historical traumas stemming from Turkey’s mistrust towards the 
malicious intentions of the Other and duplicitous deeds of Sevresphobia, Turkish 
administrations did not follow irredentist policies during the WWII and the Cold 
War but observed the neighbouring developments with an alert watchfulness. 
Against the background of unremitting physical and ontological insecurities, 
Turkey has largely been framed as a “security-oriented state” whose primary 
security policy is invariably three-fold: “ensuring the survival of the population; 
protecting territorial integrity and preserving the basic identity of a nation” 
(TMFA, 2017a, emphasize added) that parallel Turkey’s “coherent narrative about 
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doing, acting, and being” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 746) since the 1920s. Habitually, the 
fixation on the mistrustful Other imperilling Turkish-self persists as a determining 
factor behind the stable sense of agency and continuity for Turkey in its relations 
with the domestic actors given that the nation has since the mid-1980s been 
experiencing a multidimensional civil conflict against PKK. Although this security 
approach was intended to be reshaped by AKP, their attempts were futile in 
reshaping the society’s mistrustful cognitive cocoon. It is, therefore, crucial to gain 
insights about what PKK is in the first place and understand how significant a role 
it plays in the AKP’s transition agenda. 
 
4.3. PKK, AKP, and the Transition 
  
4.3.1. PKK 
For Barkey and Fuller (1998), PKK emerged during the 1970s’ tempestuous 
political atmosphere that witnessed three military coups and stringent security 
policies against the Kurdish minority. Originally established as a Marxist-Leninist 
organization to “unify Turkey’s left for revolution”, PKK later abandoned its 
unifying approach because of the “Turkish lefts’ social chauvinism” (Jongerden and 
Akkaya, 2015, pp. 35-36); and rolled out an ethnic insurgency agenda whose 
primary goal was to achieve a “unified and independent Kurdish state” (Kurdipedia, 
2017, p. 37). By applying hit-and-run tactics, PKK calculated the conventional 
army’s immobility and utilised Turkey’s weak presence in the country’s southeast. 
Complying with the tested legal ground3 to suppress opponents, Turkish security 
forces implemented the “Field Dominance” method by establishing outposts and 
controlling the Kurds’ social matrix to diminish the PKK’s influence. Culminated 
in these security measures, PKK failed to expand the resistance and declared several 
                                                 
3 Enacted by the 1982 Constitution, the State of Emergency Law, Article 122, may be enforced in 
case of rebellion and violence against the Turkish state (TPM, 2017). It has since then been practiced 
for several times.  
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ceasefires in the 1990s (1993, 1995 and 1998). After sixteen years of civil conflict, 
in 1999, Turkey captured and incarcerated Öcalan, the founding leader of PKK. 
Öcalan’s capture was supposed to be a defining moment for all of Turkey but it did 
not pay off as expected. 
Before we proceed ahead, it is imperative to highlight Çelik and Blum’s (2007) 
three points to broaden our discussion. Firstly, it is the struggle of Kurds’ politico-
cultural rights and their exclusion from the value system. Secondly, it is about the 
issues surrounding reconciliation routes on how to ensure disarmament and 
reintegration. Thirdly and most significantly, it is the question of how to settle the 
social tensions between Turks and Kurds. Evaluating the Öcalan’s ceasefire 
announcement as a promising step, the left-wing government designed a reform 
program to fulfil the first point and initiated Turkey’s candidateship to be a 
European Union (EU) member. For Akdeniz and Göker (2011), this process led to 
a relaxation of the traditional nationalist policies that all governments had until then 
harmonised their domestic agenda with military means. In order to comply with the 
Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey has advanced its reconciliation agenda whose main 
purpose was to start a democratisation move to terminate the state of emergency in 
the southeast.  
 
4.3.2. AKP 
At such a promising time, AKP prevailed as a majority party in the 2002 elections. 
Consistent with the existing policy line, they continued enhancing Kurds’ politico-
cultural rights and addressed the second point: shifting from the war-model 
approach to adopting an accommodative one. In doing so, AKP met the EU 
conditionality while mitigating the long-held grievances of the reactionist Other. 
Given the AKP leadership’s pro-Islamic orientations and background largely 
associated with the Virtue Party, one may contend that both AKP and Kurds found 
themselves on the common “victim” ground. For one thing, while being fixated as 
ontological insecurity signs against the civil and secular agency of Turkish 
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Republic, Islamists and Kurds had constitutionally been alienated from the national 
and governmental matrixes. Furthermore, the presence of a strong security culture, 
which had been authorised by the Republic’s moral standards, had unsettled the 
existential foundations of both groups as well as their stable agencies and 
behavioral routines. Adopting a liberal but extremely populist discourse, AKP 
portrayed itself as civilian democrats whose primary aim was to shift Turkey’s 
security-orientation (Altunişik and Martin, 2011). In doing so, AKP sought to 
address the Kurdish population’s physical and ontological insecurities by virtue of 
adopting a range of conciliatory measures and unilateral solutions in line with 
Öcalan’s demands. The accommodative measures include inter alia reforming 
hard-power protocols, easing military patrols quantity-wise, hastening the “Return 
to the Village and Rehabilitation Project”, and subsidizing citizens who escaped 
from the conflict to resettle (TMFA, 2017b) and were tracked down until 2004 
when PKK resumed its activities. The latter issue was regarded as a major source 
of contention and distrust between the two in the future conflict resolution 
processes.   
Ünal (2015) argues that during its longest ceasefire period, PKK sought to convert 
itself into a non-violent body. However, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to classify 
them as a terrorist organisation forced the group to resort to violence. Bacik and 
Coskun (2011) claim that the resumption of violence was attributed to the AKP’s 
rising popularity among Kurds, a worrisome trend that diluted the PKK’s influence 
and position as the Kurds’ representative. Although I concur with these scholars, I 
think there are several reasons that can best explain why PKK returned to force. 
Firstly, there had been no progress concerning Çelik and Blum’s third point: 
ameliorating the social tensions between Turks and Kurds. Therefore, considering 
the fact that the PKK’s strongholds, i.e. Kurdish towns, were shifting their political 
alliances as a result of the AKP’s rising profile, the organization’s resurgence could 
potentially make up for the ontological insecurity among the Kurds. Secondly, 
although the establishment of a unified Kurdistan or democratic autonomy has been 
the principal objective of the PKK and its leader Öcalan, the Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
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territorial gains situated the former group in an ontological uncertainty. More to 
this, such territorial advances posed a significant challenge to and even questioned 
their thirty-years-long self-reinforcing militant routines against Turkey. As 
Kinnvall (2004) would claim, the change potential challenging the PKK members’ 
long-attached self-narratives and behavioural routines resulted in ontological 
insecurity. Notwithstanding the rising violent activities, however, AKP clung to the 
conflict resolution processes and for that matter laid the foundations of the first of 
its kind, namely the Kurdish Opening. 
 
4.3.3. First Opening 
In 2005, then-prime minister Erdoğan remarked that the “Kurdish Issue is my own 
issue” (Hürriyet, 2005). In fact, by recognizing the case as a socio-political issue 
rather than framing it in military terms, Erdoğan not only re-situated the Kurd sign 
within the social matrix but also indicated a major shift from the traditional state 
routines. On the other side of the equation, however, there was a major agent-
structure dilemma to account for. In the aftermath of the PKK’s renewed activism, 
there was an exponential increase in terms of mistrust of Other and fear of change 
among the secular and nationalist factions (KONDA, 2006; IPC, 2014). In this 
context, ontologically insecure agents4, the Turkish majority, ascribed the growing 
mistrust to the historical Sevresphobia while AKP pragmatically pursued its 
Kurdish agenda, employing nationalistic discourse that yielded them 46% of the 
overall votes (50% votes of the Kurdish cities) in the 2007 elections. Consequently, 
it seems tenable to argue that Kurds felt ontologically secure as a result of the 
preceding democratization process despite the AKP’s changing discourse and 
narratives. Seizing the opportunity in 2009, AKP abruptly initiated the Kurdish 
                                                 
4 Regardless of political orientation, several think-tanks and news agencies framed this case within 
the “external powers” framework: Türk Solu (2004); Milli Gazete (2005); ICFI (2006).  
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Opening designed to remove the Othering emotion and dissolve PKK (NUBP, 
2010, pp. 12-13). According to AKP, the aim of the project was to: 
Improve the friendship bounds between communities and trust environment 
in southeastern Turkey; break the alienation and the feeling of Other in face 
of the security forces; (ibid, p. 62) also imagine Turkey as the powerful 
democratic Islamic country (ibid, p. 64). 
As an e-motion project, it strives to address Giddens’ guidelines when modifying 
the negative cognitive cocoon (1991): breaking isolation, enhancing friendship 
bonds and ensuring trust. At the outset, while the project aims at mitigating 
fundamental ontological insecurities, it places secular self in an abstract position if 
not non-governmental by referring to Turkey’s Islamic structure. As Mitzen 
(2006a) would probably concur, the deployment of the new discourse afforded AKP 
an opportunity to construct and disseminate an alternative self (Islamic identity) 
partly via resituating signs which had ever since the 1920s been identified as the 
nation’s central signifiers. Optimistically approaching the process, one may, yet, 
claim that the overarching goal of this unifying mission is to include Kurds to 
Turkey’s value system. 
The failure of the project cited above was owed to the abrupt and uncertain 
structure of the resolution program, not to mention the absence of dialogue between 
groups arising from its top-down nature. Simply put, except for the AKP’s rough 
information handout and shallow media framing, such as “Turkey to reach mutual 
platform” (NTV, 2009), and there had been no information flow regarding the 
process. Hence societal groups asking central questions, such as with whom AKP 
negotiates, what the future policy prescriptions and national strategies are? In the 
midst of the turbulent political settings, thirty-three PKK members dressed in 
traditional green militant uniforms entered Turkey through the Habur Border Gate. 
Although it was planned to be a token of disarmament, the group was saluted by 
fifty thousand people carrying the PKK flags. Due to the minor but extremely 
critical nuances accompanied by the AKP’s unilateral top-down approach, while 
Kurds saw the group as a positive asset for achieving peace, the majority of the 
Turkish population evaluated the event as a PKK victory (KONDA, 2010). Drawing 
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on Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking’s (2011) argument on the direct proportionality 
between linear traumas and ontological insecurity, one can posit that the peace 
process lost traction as a corollary of the opposition parties’ as well as the media 
criticisms — even though the public support of the process stood at 51% in the 
beginning (KONDA, 2011). Reiterating the preceding arguments, it seems that the 
hasty introduction of a top-down-designed equivocal resolution plan, not to mention 
its clandestine implementation, was a key factor in AKP’s broader miscalculation 
of the situation. Seen in this light, although AKP received the public approval, the 
circumstances gave rise to ontological insecurity instead of achieving an anticipated 
e-motioning and reshaping the mistrust-driven cognitive cocoon. 
 
4.3.4. Second Opening  
According to Çelik (2015), Turks’ experienced trauma and fear as a direct result of 
the Habur incident contributed to a chronic increase in nationalistic tendencies. One 
may claim that since there had not been any psychological strategy to modify the 
cocoon, ontologically insecure agents fixated the incident on the question of 
“making peace with the mistrustful Other”. Accordingly, they reutilized the 
nationalist discourse to secure their sense of agency. This mistrust, however, was 
also prevalent among Kurds as AKP disbanded the pro-Kurdish party and resorted 
to the traditional security culture.  
Taking lessons from the first attempt, I argue that AKP’s second e-motion process 
in 2013 compassed some key strategic communication assertions that assuaged the 
ontological insecurities of the Turkish majority in relative terms and energised their 
socio-political matrix to modify mistrustful cognitive cocoon: 
• First of all, AKP strove to shift its monological top-down communication 
pattern to a dialogical understanding in order to “communicate 
purposefully to advance its mission” (Hallahan et. al, 2007, p. 4). Thus, the 
actors involved in the second resolution process were diversified as AKP, 
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PKK (represented as the “Kurdish side” in the Oslo Records which I 
elaborate below) and the pro-Kurdish party. 
• Secondly, completion of this assertion helped to increase stability and 
reduce uncertainty since AKP and PKK (via the mediation of the pro-
Kurdish party) strained to work collectively and transmit their information 
flow, if not leaked (T24, 2013a).  
• Thirdly, AKP and PKK barely agreed on the peace formula as a token of re-
switching routinized security-orientation. To spread this policy route, AKP 
commenced a parliamentary board seeking peaceful ways to settle the civil 
conflict (Official Gazette, 2013).  
• Fourthly and most remarkably, AKP commissioned the pro-government 
Akil İnsanlar Komitesi (shortly Akil İnsanlar). Akil İnsanlar, which 
consisted of 63 famous people and recognised opinion leaders, ensured that 
many diverse voices and viewpoints towards the Kurdish issue were listened 
to and encouraged to rebuild a shared reality, a fixated socio-political 
matrix, through an asymmetrical dialogue platform. Ideally, Akil İnsanlar, 
therefore, would not only facilitate an interactive bottom-up engagement but 
also decode the society’s ontological insecurities to reach a common 
emotional and cognitive platform that would proliferate trust while 
diminishing the negative foundations of their cognitive cocoon formation 
(Giddens, 1991). 
In light of the Akil İnsanlar’s regional reports acquired from both communities, one 
may safely claim that there are two-must-to-do points: a) we need to break the 
prejudices; b) other than PKK, society must be heeded (Hürriyet, 2013). On the one 
hand, it was a success of the reviewed communication channels that the society 
recognised their ontological insecurities and were seeking to change their 
mistrustful cognitive cocoon. On the other hand, however, there were several 
unfulfilled strategic communication assertions that could not help Turkey to remove 
some existential questions from the table, which stonewalled AKP to properly 
modify their historically-built antagonism and mistrust towards the Other:  
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• First of all, one may notice from the regional reports that people disapproved 
the AKP’s PKK fixation. It was later revealed in the Oslo Records that AKP 
had confidentially negotiated and designed both resolution processes with 
PKK (CNN Türk, 2012). Under these circumstances, Turkish society could 
not track a clear agenda to break down its firm routines and reshape the pre-
established meanings with the Other.  
• The second missing assertion, which also contributed to increasing in 
mistrust, concerns the fixation of the Kurd and PKK signs to each other. 
According to the leaked Oslo Records, which has not been denied by AKP, 
prior to the first Opening process, the “Turkish side” was represented by a 
few national intelligence bureaucrats commissioned by AKP, while the 
“Kurdish side” relied on some PKK militants who agreed on nine articles 
(known as Oslo Protocol) that had not only set the course of the first 
Opening but also the second Opening as the Akil İnsanlar’s reports 
unfolded. AKP thus did not only reduce a ninety-years-long socio-political 
dilemma to the “dropping guns” criteria but also ignore the psycho-cultural 
consensus-building, which would re-situate the society’s mistrustful Other 
sign. 
• The third missing assertion of the Oslo Protocol deals with the two-fold 
representation issue: a) by accepting PKK as Kurds’ only representative, 
AKP by-passed de jure the pro-Kurdish party which would help AKP to 
push the PKK-linked material bargaining to the second place and provide a 
sustainable platform to design a stable and clear resolution plan; b) there 
was a major civil society problem. Although AKP received the social 
grievances concerning the mistrust and enlargement of the resolution 
actors, they only utilised the pro-government Akil İnsanlar and had not 
promoted the bottom-up approaches as they did not incorporate the local 
voices and civil society into the decision-making mechanism. This attitude 
has not only blocked the involvement of the other actors to reach a mutual 
understanding but also demarcated traditionally arbiter institutions, e.g. 
Turkish Armed Forces.  
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In such a delicate resolution program in which only pro-government Akil İnsanlar 
was operational, both communities were suffering from the representation problem, 
PKK designated a sin qua non for the peace process while requesting Turkey to 
defend Kobane, a Kurdish town in Syria, which was under the ISIS threat at that 
time:  
Opening and Kobane are two separable issues. If one breakdown, the other 
one also collapses (Radikal, 2014) 
As one may foresee, accompanied with the tempestuous atmosphere triggering from 
the Arab Spring, this fixation had reached a deadlock and led to a political crisis of 
“Turkish soldiers to defend Kurds in Syria but to what end?”. After this crossway, 
two sides had lost their trust of each other, which had been cultivated after rugged 
processes; then started to give ultimatums and preconditions to each other for a 
peaceful solution. As this “preconditions war” or more of a shuttle diplomacy 
between Erdoğan and Öcalan collapsed, the process diminished accordingly.  
In this attempt, public support for the peaceful resolution increased to 81% 
(KONDA 2013 report, cited by T24, 2013b) albeit only some claims (relatively 
stable and clear agenda, transmission of the information flow, spreading of policy 
routes and one-way initiated bottom-up social engagement) of the strategic 
communication were partly fulfilled by AKP. One may thus argue that in the case 
of full attachment to strategic communication, parties may remove existential 
questions from the table more efficiently and mitigate ontological insecurities while 
reshaping their mistrustful cognitive cocoon. Notwithstanding, the adverse impact 
of the missing assertions may delineate a roadmap for future resolution programs 
that the parties need to re-fixate the myriad of antagonistic symbols, conflict ethos 
and self-defeating behavioural routines which directly influence the agents’ 
emotional level. Therefore, strategic communication may deliver two lessons. 
Firstly, parties are obliged to grasp the basic elements of the historically-shaped 
antagonism and conflict psychology whose reconciliation is the hardest part of the 
peace processes and require more effort than ensuring physical security. Secondly, 
they must be aware of the fact that the conflict resolution is a communication 
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process, an essentially emotional one, not an event. Therefore, it requires a 
transparent and clear conflict resolution agenda, an engaged civil society motivated 
to incorporate both societies into the decision-making process, which is the key for 
to restoration of the majority-Other relation to collectively rebuild shared reality, 
and most significantly, socio-political commitment to reaching a common 
emotional and cognitive platform which would modify the mistrustful cognitive 
cocoon and create a momentum for e-motion. Otherwise, even if the second conflict 
resolution initiatives reach more public support than the previous attempts, parties 
may re-start to perceive each other as untrustworthy (ICG, 2014); and attach their 
politico-military agenda in line with their moral standards shaped in light of their 
tested and proved routines. 
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5. Case Study Analysis: Israel 
 
 
5.1.  From Ethno-religious Community to the Nation  
According to Goren (2009), for centuries Jews were exposed to anti-Semitism and 
othering policies that transmission of these experiences between the generations has 
given rise to creation of an introvert Jewish self. Jewish socio-cultural matrix, in 
fact, has been carrying the heritage of isolated victim image5 as prominent Jewish 
holidays, Purim and Channukah, memorialise Jews’ victorious revolts against 
ancient despots. The centuries-old routinized fear and existential insecurities that 
Jews have encountered have therefore contributed significantly to the formation of 
a mistrustful cognitive cocoon. The cocoon shaped up to be the dominant 
ontological security provider as recurrent dreads and insecurities compelled Jews 
to search for a safe haven through the Zionist movement. With this proposition in 
mind, I will in this part dwell on particular themes and discussions around the 
construction of Jewishness, the central signifier of the Israeli identity, followed by 
a thorough examination of Zionism and its role in the making of the Israeli nation.   
To begin with, it is safe to posit that Jews acquire their cognitively unique self 
through many cultural-Biblical references such as Peter 2: 9 and Exodus 19: 6. 
From among these numerous references, it seems that Genesis 12: 1-2 serves as a 
key passage crafting Jewishness: 
The Lord had said to Abram, “Go…to the land I will show you (today’s 
Israel)”; “I will make you into a great nation, and I will bless you; I will make 
your name great…” (Biblegateway, 2017, emphasis added). 
This discursively formulated sense of God’s chosen tribe agency interlocks Jewish 
ethnicity with religion. Thus, in contradistinction to the classic understanding of 
                                                 
5 Israeli policymakers still refer to this image.  
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ethnicity, Jewishness is founded on two overarching signs: religion and ethnic 
belonging. Against this backdrop, during the 1800s’, the Jewish community was 
tried to be homogenised within the European prototypes of the modern nation-
states. These sets of circumstances and contributing factors, which later played a 
key role in the construction of the “Jewish question6”, motivated Jews to seek out 
ways of survival and security. Strictly speaking, they had two options: either to be 
assimilated by the nation-states, which would protect their physical existence but 
annihilate their behavioural routines of a Jewish self; or to reject anti-Semitic 
policies and establish their own “legally secured homeland in Palestine” (JVL, 
2017a). This re-establishing of the promised land project, however, was proposed 
by Zionists who would seek to build a secular nation-state encompassing all Jews. 
One may claim that the Zionist overture was unprecedented in the Jewish history 
primarily because the religious sign of the Jewish self was re-situated and assigned 
a peripheral space in the construction of the imagined nation. Although many 
traditionalist Orthodox Jews disputed the Zionists’ radical Jewishness vision, the 
movement was later on regarded as a beacon of survival during the catastrophic 
WWI period.  
By means of lobbying activities in the 1910s, the establishment of a British-
protected Jewish “national home” in Palestine was guaranteed through the Balfour 
Declaration (1917). While the long-awaited promised land was in the making, there 
was a vital strategy to be pursued: “restore the country (Palestine) without a people 
to the people (Jews) without a country” (Zangwill, 1901, p. 15). According to this 
view, it can be inferred that the underlying plan was to colonise Palestine. 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the pre-Israel developments reveals that the plan 
required a two-fold agenda: 1) formation of a new Jewish self, 2) ensuring its 
existence. As for the first objective, the new secular self would emerge by dint of 
purveying the apparatuses and accoutrements needed for creating a nation-state. 
Hence, Zionists established the national legislature, later to be known as the Israeli 
                                                 
6 In “On the Jewish Question”, Marx argued that it emerged due to the capitalist expansion. 
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Parliament; arranged multi-party elections, and authorised courts under the British 
Common Law. Add to these paramount initiatives the revival of the ancient Hebrew 
language founded upon the Cartesian principle of the new Jewish self in light of the 
fact that the language was almost vanished until the Jewish autonomy came to 
being. Meanwhile, the aggression between the Palestinian and Jewish communities, 
which had been experienced since the 1920s, aggravated by the 1936–39 Arab 
Revolt in Palestine. Under the circumstances, a paramilitary force, better known as 
Haganah, was created in an attempt to fulfill the second objective. Haganah 
members later on became high-ranking Israeli policymakers, namely Ben-Gurion, 
founder of Israel, and Dayan, IDF’s chief of staff among others, whose personal 
and direct experience of war traumas contributed to a strong security culture which 
I will explain in the following section.  
The year 1947 was the turning point for the promised land. Upon the British request, 
the United Nations (UN) proposed the famous Partition Plan of Palestine between 
Jews and Palestinians. Although the Jewish side accepted the plan, Palestinian side 
and the Arab League supporting their brothers (Khalidi, 2001) rejected this 
territorial division. The disagreement between the two camps transformed an 
ongoing civil war into an all-out war between Arabs and Israelis in 1948 which 
resulted in a Jewish victory and the Declaration of the Establishment of State of 
Israel:  
Palestine was the birthplace of the Jewish people…generations had been 
working to re-establish their ancient homeland. We appeal — in the very 
midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months — to the Arab 
inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the 
upbuilding of the State…We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the 
Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Israel in the tasks of immigration and 
upbuilding… the redemption of Israel (IMFA, 2017a, the original text written 
in italics). 
Many points merit attention as the declaration cited above is concerned and 
contextualised within the scope of Zionist doctrines. To begin with, this centuries-
old remoteness of Jews from their homeland, Israel, is inextricably entrenched in 
the cultural continuity of Judaism. Acknowledging the nation-building apparatuses, 
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one can argue that this tradition-bound religious sign of Jewishness is to a great 
extent intertwined with the newly introduced national identity (Israeliness). As 
Schweid (2002, p. 84) argues, Israel, on the one hand, can be viewed as “the state 
of the Jews”, and, on the other hand, “a Jewish state” — that commits itself to the 
Zionist principle of encircling all Jews under the legally secured homeland. What 
can be inferred here is that these structures and dynamics are challenging because 
Palestinian-Israeli relations are conceived in a volatile and flimsy atmosphere 
wherein their religious and national identities are diametrically opposed. This might 
be the core reason that although the Israeli majority demonstrates a willingness to 
live with the Other, they recognise the Other as Arabs, not Palestinians. Hence, the 
state of Israel does not only fixate Palestinians, who previously inhabited the Israel, 
out of the newly formed state’s value system but also refuse their assistance while 
re-making the promised land. Countering the denial of the Other’s existence, 
Grosbard (2003) highlights the national euphoria both experienced but only one 
camp could catapult this emotion to a high altitude after the War of Independence. 
His argument is enlightening to grasp the reasoning behind how the fixation of the 
Palestinian Other is directly connected with the twenty-years-long ideological fight 
between Palestinian nationalists and Zionists who were constantly trying to limit 
each other’s socio-political matrix. In light of the aforesaid arguments, I will in the 
proceeding security culture segment try to further investigate the several driving 
forces causing this distancing between Israelis and Palestinians as well as the 
decade-long conflicts. 
 
5.2.  Shaping the Security Culture   
It is quite axiomatic that the Jewish population was subject to physical and 
ontological insecurities for centuries as evidenced by the traumas of the Holocaust, 
which has had an enduring influence on the political decision-making processes in 
Israel. This factor has contributed to Israel’s feelings of insecurity which since 1948 
has dominated the socio-political environment and the resultant chronic insecurity 
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syndrome among Israelis (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). Hence the claim here is that this 
routinized insecurity, spurred by the early conflicts and in opposition to the 
Palestinian Other, has become an integral component of the mistrustful cognitive 
cocoon. Furthermore, it has been a major challenge to ontological security that 
underpins Israel’s alarmist security culture and motivates it to adhere to its tested 
rebellion-settling routines. Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s premise according to 
which Israeli behavioural and policy practices, irrespective of whether or not they 
are linguistically implemented, help knot-by-knot construction of the Israeli socio-
political matrix (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002), the following section is set to 
deconstruct the routinization of the Israeli security culture through behavioural 
signs. 
Compared to Turkey’s Milli Mücadele movement, which was largely associated 
with and informed by the former Ottoman officers’ imperial army experiences, 
Jews had not served as combatants or formed resistance groups until the 1920s. 
However, as briefly stated above, they needed to defy and counter the internal and 
external opponents. Concomitantly, they created local paramilitary groups such as 
Haganah and Palmah prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. These groups 
struggled for the existence of the new Jewish self by deploying hard power against 
anti-Jewish riots and Palestinian guerrilla activities. The very defence organisations 
were formed in such ways to protect kibbutzim, agricultural communities where the 
majority of Jews lived before Israel was found, while receiving voluntary troops 
from these communities (Haganah, Vol. 8). This self-promoting system was 
devised at the time of escalation of Palestinian-Jewish conflict during the 1930s as 
a result of which kibbutzim was molded into a politico-military structure. This 
would mean that kibbutzniks, people who live in these communities, were expected 
to participate in the Hanagah’s revised security strategy sought to provide 
“complete independence of any non-Jewish factor” (ibid, p. 202). For that matter, 
adjacent kibbutzim were combined into several monoblocs and their living matrixes 
were isolated by concrete walls. For Allon (1971), Palmah commander, this 
strategy situated kibbutzim at the apex of Jewish socio-political matrix in which 
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they served as local bulwarks against Palestinian incursions while promoting the 
Jewish colonisation project. Allon’s claim, in fact, proved itself as almost entire 
kibbutzim supported paramilitary forces in the War of Independence while 
defending the newly declared Israel against the Arab League and Palestinian troops 
on multiple fronts.  
I argue that kibbutzim and local paramilitary forces were the two constitutive 
elements forming the bedrock of Israel’s security culture. On the one hand, 
kibbutzim members ensured the biographical continuity of the unique Jewish self 
through performing their behavioural routines and traditional identity within their 
insulated communities. On the other hand, they played a key role for the Jewish 
self-defence organisations while protecting the territory from the Other’s influence. 
As a corollary of this strong embeddedness between kibbutzim and paramilitaries, 
IDF’s security culture has not only become a natural extension of the Israeli society 
but also a complementary determinant of their internalised self-narratives and 
continuous agency after having been exposed to continual attacks and by literally 
constructing a “siege” against the Other. Accordingly, practices of the paramilitary 
groups, most specifically Palmah whose aim was to establish buffer zones between 
Jews and the Other, appeared to have vindicated their historically-embedded self-
defence behaviour and shaped the IDF’s ally-opponent network (Kinnvall, 2004), 
regulating Israel’s moral standards for survival (Rumelili, 2015). Routinization of 
these moral standards into the state structure has later gained momentum because 
even Orthodox Jews criticising the Zionist vision appear to accept their fixation of 
the Palestinian Other (Peleg and Waxman, 2007). 
Consequently, this strong distancing coupled with the centuries-long mistrust 
transformed the Palestinian Other into the antagonist Other, which poses an 
ontological insecurity threat for the unique Israeli self. This already delimited socio-
political matrix is thus fixated on the new Israeli subject position, the lifeblood of 
Israel, as an element that needs to be secured without the Other’s influence. Proving 
that claim, the land (Palestine) is assigned as the key signifier supporting the central 
signifier of Israeliness that disengaging from the territory is considered something 
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unimaginable (Lupovici, 2015). Therefore, to preserve the unique Israeli identity, 
de-Otherization of the land is legalised by Law and Administration Ordinance of 
1948 displacing more than a half million Palestinians out of Israel, and the Law of 
Return7 prohibiting those expatriates to reclaim their right upon the land. 
Subsequent Israeli governments have routinized this tested practice to keep the 
Palestinian Other (categorically fixated minority) away from the Israeli territory 
(key signifier of the majority) by means of passing a series of military articles. 
These military provisions include, inter alia, Emergency (Security Zones) 
Regulations (1949) authorizing military commanders to expropriate the land by 
“protected zone”, thus setting the stage for Israeli Military Governorate to rule the 
occupied territories after the Six-day War of 1967 (Mehozay, 2016); and Land 
Acquisition Law (1953) allowing Israel to control the recently confiscated 
Palestinian villages (Bisharat, 1994). In tandem with these isolationist policies, it is 
noteworthy that such behavioural signs undergirding their security orientation have 
demonstrated a biographical continuity as tested conflict resolution methods since 
the 1920s, exemplified by the construction of the Israeli West Bank wall separating 
the Israeli agency from the Palestinian Other. 
Giddens (1991) would argue that the mistrustful cognitive cocoon around which the 
political psychology of the majority of Israelis was formed functioned as a conduit 
for inculcation of a unique sense of agency and distinct identity of Israeliness that 
were absent in the Palestinian Other. Nevertheless, this emotion-laden self-defence 
mechanism was intensified as the approved distancing behaviours were employed 
following fedayeen retaliations and destructive conflicts, such as the Six-day War 
and the Yom Kippur War (1973). As this insulated identity pattern hampering the 
enhancement of local ties with the mistrustful Other remains to be a major 
ontological security source of Israel’s biographical continuity, it exacerbates the 
conflict between IDF and PLO, later Hamas since the 1960s. Although this security 
culture was intended to undergo changes by Israel, attempts to restructure the 
                                                 
7 Aka “Aliyah Right” referring to Israeli-government-supported immigrations to Israel. The law 
discriminates against non-Jewish immigration and land reclaiming (Knesset, 2017).  
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society’s mistrustful cocoon formation did not fall through as expected. It is thus 
vital to assess what PLO is at first and further examine what role it plays in the 25th 
and 28th Israeli governments’ transition agenda. 
 
5.3. PLO, Changing Israel, and the Transition 
 
 
5.3.1.  PLO 
PLO was established as an Arab League-supported nationalist body seeking to 
liberate Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arabs and identity, through 
armed revolution (JVL, 2017b) at a time of mounting pan-Arabist sentiments in the 
1960s. Displaying many Othering resemblances with Israel’s founding 
proclamation, the PLO Covenant rejected the Balfour Declaration and denied the 
“existence” of the Zionist and colonialist Israel (ibid). Nevertheless, the politico-
military views of the PLO and its initial position underwent significant changes 
after the catastrophic Six-day War, which resulted in the defeat of the pan-Arab 
nationalists. For Mohamad (1998), along with the Israeli occupation over the 
remaining Palestinian hubs, this failure compelled PLO to design their own national 
liberation program. Conceding the engrained doctrinal backdrop and advanced 
human resources capacity, Fatah emerged as an attractive force that would lead and 
restructure PLO. The Fatah cadres were aware that the Arab League strategies, 
based on conventional attacks against the highly seasoned IDF soldiers, had become 
obsolete. Therefore, driven by the historical fears and antagonism towards the 
Jewish Other, their liberation agenda, the People’s Revolutionary War, was built on 
guerilla tactics that would “not only the wiping out of an Imperialist base but, what 
is more important, the extinction of a (Israeli) society” (Fatah’s Doctrine, 1968, p. 
11).  
Owing to the thick discourse and the renewed siege psychology, Israel sought to 
elevate the threat level of the fedayeen attacks to intolerable terrorist activities, 
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previously categorized as political harassments (Balpınar, 2012). Proceeding to the 
next step, Israel adhered to its routinized conflict resolution method, de-
Otherization of the land by walls and checkpoints from the categorically detached 
Other, to secure the Israeli agency. Israel hence launched a military rule8, which 
was replaced with the civil administration in 1981, to delimit the Palestinian living 
matrix and control the fedayeens’ manoeuvring area. On the Israeli side, one may 
see the damaging outcomes of these isolationist policies which added to the Israelis’ 
mistrust (83%) towards the Palestinian Other (Smooha, 1984). On the Palestinian 
side, however, one could read the impact of the same policies as a step-by-step 
approach through the Munich massacre, the Yom Kippur War, and a critical 
Palestinian uprising, the first intifada (1987-1993) laying the groundwork for the 
Oslo Accords that tried to re-situate the Palestinian Other sign within the Israeli 
socio-political matrix. 
 
5.3.2.  Changing Israel and Oslo Accords 
According to Golan (2009), prior to the Oslo Accords, there were a few missed 
peace opportunities to bring about peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a 
chronological order, as Golan puts, the first attempt relates to the “intermediary” 
proposal of the Jordanian King Hussein (1967), which was rejected by Israel. The 
second initiative was made by the Egyptian President el-Sadat who through UN 
assistance (1971) proposed a peace treaty that would make the Yom Kippur War 
redundant. The third opportunity came during the Camp David negotiations (1978) 
in which the PLO’s exclusion from the possible “autonomous Palestine plan” was 
proffered as a solution. Major obstacles arising from the three negotiation processes 
prevented accommodative and conciliatory approaches from yielding concrete and 
sustainable results such as reaching a peaceful roadmap. Regardless of these 
botched opportunities, one must be mindful that prior to the outbreak of the first 
                                                 
8 Authorised by the Emergency (Security Zones) Regulations (1949). 
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intifada, PLO was mulling over non-violent alternatives, such as the Amman 
Agreement (1985) under which a confederative Palestine could be established 
under Jordanian sovereignty which would put an end to the Palestinian guerilla 
fights. Similar to PKK’s abrupt reactions toward the Iraqi Kurdistan case, PLO’s 
radical wing insisted on the self-destructive military formula towards Israel (Süer 
and Atmaca, 2007). This was perhaps a continuation of their twenty-five-years-long 
behavioral routines that scuttled the PLO’s peace initiatives, which would otherwise 
secure the Palestinian identity both physically and ontologically. 
The first intifada erupted on the heels of the decade-long psychological pressures 
weighing down on the Palestinian socio-political matrix and the aggravated security 
culture. Notwithstanding the salience of antagonistic policies underlying the 
intifada, Israel first perceived the movement as a rebellion, thereby fixating the state 
apparatuses on protecting the law and order (Vitullo, 1989), authorised by the 
Emergency Regulations (1949). One may claim that coupled with the IDF’s 
inability to control the intifada, PLO promptly utilised public resistance. 
Accordingly, it first abandoned terrorism means and accepted Israel’s right to exist 
to legitimise the intifada (Mohamad, 1998), then unilaterally declared the 
independent Palestinian state on Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza that was 
recognised by the UN and various countries within a year.  
Multiple caveats merit attention as the above psychological breaking points are 
concerned. Firstly, IDF did not alleviate the intifada albeit employing strict 
measures. Israel therefore, for the first time, failed to secure its land (socio-political 
fortress) where Israeli agency (central signifier) was being performed without the 
Other’s influence. Secondly, this living matrix, which was fixated as the major 
signifier of Israeliness, was now recognised as the non-existent Other’s state by the 
international actors that challenged Israel’s biographical continuity being stably 
performed since the 1920s. Thirdly, Palestinians’ awareness that the liberation of 
the Palestinian homeland and identity was not an invisible phenomenon but a 
reality that necessitated: 1) a collectively resisting society to exist, 2) a peaceful 
agenda to be recognised.  
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These colossal challenges appeared to shape the Israeli public opinion regarding the 
Palestinian living matrix so much so that they began to see collective uprisings as 
the natural consequences of Israel’s physical and psychological domination over 
Palestinians (Bar-on, 1996). This major shift towards the Other has not only been 
embraced by the society apparatuses, but also by high-ranking officials as 
evidenced by Defence Minister Rabin’s remarks: 
The solution would have to be political – through negotiation leading to a 
political settlement, rather than military means (cited by Morris, 2001, p. 587, 
emphasis added) 
As can be seen, for the first time an Israeli policymaker surveyed the Palestinian 
issue beyond the military program, discursively assigning Israel with an 
accommodative vision to reshape the Palestinian notion. As Rabin’s discourse 
reiterates the existence of a Palestinian identity, it seems that he does not only re-
situate the Palestinian sign within the Israeli socio-political matrix but also relay a 
major change towards the state routines which were soon to be unfolded. According 
to the then-deputy premier, Peres (1995), Israel has firstly reformed its military 
regulations concerning the cohesive power; secondly, improved the IDF’s internal 
checks-and-balances system; and lastly, modified the notorious Emergency 
Regulations to protect the rights of Israel’s Arab citizens. In the context of these 
conciliatory moves, the Israeli government and the Palestinian side practiced their 
first face-to-face peace dialogue in the Madrid Conference (1991). It is noteworthy 
to mention that several prudent considerations of the Madrid Conference, i.e. the 
free flow of information between groups, using third party and meeting in a 
recognized platform, helped Israel mitigate its mistrustful cognitive cocoon that had 
encouraged the Israeli government to design an e-motion project at Oslo that was 
alleged to build trust and long-term peace, which later on backpedalled due to 
crucial miscalculations. 
Seeing the Madrid Conference as an opportunity to broker a peace between Israelis 
and Palestinians, the 25th government of Israel entered into talks with PLO in 1993. 
When the Oslo Accords was signed in the same year, Israelis “woke up to a new, 
  
55 
 
dramatic reality” (Cohen-Almagor, 2012, p. 563). The first principle of this 
abruptly arranged peace initiative was to: 
Put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence, 
mutual dignity and security, while recognising their mutual legitimate and 
political rights (IMFA, 2017b, emphasis added) 
The Article XVI of the Accord under the Confidence Building Measures section 
also incorporated some of the provisions and principles cited above: 
…to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere…to establish a 
solid basis of mutual trust and good faith… new relations between the two 
peoples, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures (ibid, 
emphasis added) 
As an e-motion project, it shares a similar vision with the AKP’s First Kurdish 
Opening plan aimed at modifying a self-damaging cocoon formation: alleviating 
the conflict through trust and confidence, promoting mutual understanding, etc. 
Lupovici (2015) argues that the Accord seeks to offer a democratic Israeli self. 
Concurring with the self-construction narrative, however, it is vital to note that 
while re-situating the historically shaped behavioural signs, the Accord introduces 
something more than a democratic self, who is expected to be liberal and respect 
the Other, but rather a peaceful self who first breaks its long-attached routinized 
isolation with the non-existent Other and then co-exist with it. In doing so, this e-
motion assignment principally intends to introduce both communities to each 
other’s value system. Yet it did not envisage and carefully consider the 
psychological barriers perpetuating these systems and cognitive cocoon formations. 
Firstly, the Oslo Accords was a top-down initiative without trust-building. Unlike 
the Madrid Conference, this secret negotiation avoided any international arbitration 
and occurred between a few PLO élites and a small Israeli group (Parson, 2009). 
The peace accord was conceived on shaky ground since Israel fixated PLO as the 
sole representative of the Palestinians (trusted by 37% of Palestinians), and 
disregarded Hamas (trusted by 15% of Palestinians) (JVL, 2017c) whose isolation 
later revived the self-damaging behavioural routines of the Palestinian guerrillas 
such as suicide bombings that PLO had not controlled. Secondly, the peace project 
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was hastily arranged and announced accordingly without addressing the existential 
questions and re-fixating the key signs constituting the Israeli-Palestinian living 
matrix. Questions include “How can two sides work to alter the conflict ethos?”, 
“Is there an emotional foundation and transformation-driven agenda securing the 
peaceful co-existence?”, and most significantly, “Do these societies trust each other 
before operating the Accord?”. To put the argument one step further, a Palestinian 
interviewee answered the above questions in one paragraph: 
On the one hand the rhetoric was of peace, while on the other hand the 
settlements were being expanded… ‘normalization’ could not continue… 
transformational modalities … cooperation and communication channels… 
building trust so as to create support for a potential peace process (UNESCO, 
2007, p. 30). 
Apparently, these fundamental questions were not considered in detail as the 
process was shortly interrupted by the Hamas-orchestrated suicide bombings and 
IDF’s harsh response. The Accords, therefore, had fixated on the bodily and 
territorial security criteria, “renouncing Palestinian terrorism” and “withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from Palestinian territories”, rather than implementing peaceful 
coexistence program through modifying cognitive cocoon. This rapidly discussed 
and hastily crafted agenda was soon to be scuttled and it practically collapsed as a 
result of the ensuing violent conflicts and assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. 
Consequently, the two sides re-attached to their preceding vision and labelled each 
other mistrustful (Sela, 2009) although Israeli public support to the Accords was 
48% (Leon, 1995). 
 
5.3.3.  Roadmap for Peace  
The Oslo Accords has gradually collapsed after the series of negative experiences 
albeit tried to be restored through the Oslo II Accords (1995), which was signed 
two months before Rabin was murdered, the Hebron Protocol (1997) and Wye 
Memorandum (1999). One may nevertheless claim that since these agreements 
were largely designed as territory-driven agreements they ultimately fell into the 
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same error as that of the Oslo Accords. Apart from these attempts, the Camp David 
Summit (2000), the last attempt before the Roadmap for Peace (2002), merit 
mentioning before proceeding. According to the US Department of State (2017), 
which reflects the official records of the host county arranging the summit, the 
negotiations could not reach a settlement because the Palestinian side was not 
content with the final covenant although Israelis was going to make game changer 
concessions on Palestinians’ right of return, something akin to the Aliyah right. A 
month after the failed negotiation, however, the second intifada erupted. From a 
vantage point, this uprising differed from its preceding example, the first intifada, 
in two ways. Firstly, as it broke out shortly after the unsuccessful Camp David 
Summit, the timing of the act raised interrogation marks regarding the nature of the 
second intifada. Attesting this claim, ontologically insecure agents fuelled with 
historical mistrust of the Other, portrayed the second intifada, as an architected 
movement of the Palestinian side remonstrating the Camp David fiasco (The 
Jerusalem Post, 2010). Secondly, unlike the first intifada showing the vivid pattern 
of civil disobedience and collective resistance, the Palestinian side rather employed 
the terrorism means in this attempt which, I believe, have impaired the “repressed 
Palestinian image” in the minds of international actors — that had legitimised the 
movement while making it visible eight years ago. In this socio-political turmoil 
where two sides had experienced war-like clashes, the 9/11 attacks occurred.  
For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US involvement in the post-9/11 Middle 
East manifested itself by delivering the 28th Israeli Government a comprehensive 
peace agenda, namely the Roadmap for Peace (hereafter Roadmap) (2003). I argue 
that Israel’s this initiative, which, in fact, was designed by the US as I explicate 
below, was planned to be another e-motion project like the Oslo Accords. The 
Roadmap, however, fulfilled some key strategic communication assertions that 
mitigated the ontological insecurities of the Israeli majority in relative terms and 
stimulated their socio-political matrix to modify mistrustful cognitive cocoon: 
• Firstly and most importantly, this plan was not secretly designed and 
immediately initiated. Therefore, it augmented stability and detracted 
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uncertainty while informing the Israeli and Palestinian societies regarding 
the Roadmap, which was finalised after two drafts (EU-draft and US-draft) 
(The Road Map, 2003).  
• Secondly, this peace formula was arranged by international arbitration, the 
US and UN Security Council9, which aimed at re-switching Israel’s 
routinized security-orientation. To spread this policy route, they designated 
a clear outline, the performance-based roadmap, through appointing 
timelines and target dates that would promote accountability a parameter 
missing in the Oslo Accord. 
• Thirdly, the internationally-devised roadmap was designed to inspire Israeli 
and Palestinian policymakers through providing a transparent platform 
where they would transmit their information flow and work collectively to 
execute the Roadmap’s final stage, namely permanent two-state solution 
(UN, 2003).  
• Fourthly, the Roadmap decided to utilise the NGOs during the resolution 
(ibid). However, neither their duties nor their names were described, not to 
mention them being allocated the shortest sub-section (two lines) in the 
eight-pages long Roadmap.  
A year after its unveiling, this ground-breaking Roadmap, however, encountered a 
logjam as a corollary of unfulfilled strategic communication assertions that could 
not help Israel to remove central existential questions from the table, which 
obstructed the 28th Israeli Government from properly modifying their historically-
built antagonism and mistrust towards to the Other:  
• First of all, although the Roadmap was a non-confidentially designed 
formula for the peaceful resolution, which informed both societies, it was 
not motivated to assure the mutual understanding; and serve as a “common 
denominator” (Tindall and Holtzhausen, 2011, p. 74). This claim became 
visible when the Roadmap vaguely outlined the denouements of the 
                                                 
9 S/RES/1515 (2003) 
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existentially critical signs, e.g. the circumstance of the Other’s sovereignty 
and Jewish settlements, rather than mitigating these ontological insecurity 
sources.  
• Secondly, the Roadmap was a paragon of the top-down peace initiative that 
culminated in two-fold difficulties: a) two societies which were subjected 
to this plan, the Palestinians and the Israelis, were sceptic about the 
Roadmap’s highly top-down nature (The Road Map, 2003) that did not 
enlarge the resolution actors and incorporate local voices and civil society 
into the decision-making mechanism as the US-plan by-passed their 
participation; b) besides, both sides’ policymakers only requested minor 
revision to the Roadmap’s outline that worsened this challenging agenda. 
• Thirdly, the Israeli and Palestinian sides’ compliance to the Roadmap was 
primarily fixated on the same condition that existed in the Oslo Accords: 
“end to the violence and terrorism” (UN, 2003, p. 1). The obligatory trait of 
this condition in fact brought positive results: 85% of the Palestinians who 
previously supported the violent second intifada (JMCC, 2001), claimed 
that they opposed the violence (73%) while the Roadmap was implementing 
(Ross, 2003). Nevertheless, this optimistic vision supporting an 
accommodative approach was not catapulted to new heights as the Roadmap 
did not only degrade the eighty-year-long socio-political conflict to the 
“dropping guns” condition but also ignored the psycho-cultural consensus-
building, which would have re-situated the society’s mistrustful Other sign. 
As a corollary of major miscalculations and gradually progressing violence, the 
Roadmap reached a deadlock within a year and two sides lost their trust to each 
other regarding the peaceful transition that hindered parties from taking further 
steps to fulfill long-sought peaceful coexistence. After this intersection, parties 
could not track the Roadmap and had started to recriminate each other, which 
catalysed the Roadmap’s collapse. On the one hand, the Palestinian side was:  
Convinced that Israel will behave as it did during Oslo… and avoid real 
change (ICG 2003 report, cited by The Road Map, 2003, p. 87).  
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On the other hand, the Israeli Prime Minister, Sharon, announced in 2004 that:  
There exists no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward 
a settlement (IMFA, 2017c, emphasis added)  
Following Sharon’s statement, Israel has initiated a unilateral withdrawal by 
building concrete walls (Balpınar, 2012). This performance has not only concluded 
the Roadmap in practical terms, but also conformed with Israel’s tested and proved 
politico-military routines which would once again isolate the majority from the 
Other’s influence rather than depleting the historically-built antagonism. 
In this inconclusive e-motion project, public support and optimism for the peaceful 
settlement increased substantially (Palestinians 60%, JMCC, 2004; Israelis 63%, 
PSR, 2004), although only a few assertions (stable and clear agenda, explicit 
information exchange, spreading of policy routes and state-level initiated 
cooperation platform) of the strategic communication were fulfilled by the 28th 
Israeli Government. Rehearsing my claim provided in the Turkey chapter, one may 
reckon that both camps could well remove the existential question from the table 
and mitigate ontological insecurities while reshaping their mistrustful cognitive 
cocoon if they comprehensively employed strategic communication. Nonetheless, 
the challenging effects of the unfulfilled assertions may provide instructions for 
future resolution attempts that both sides need to apprehend psychological driving 
forces of the self-defeating behavioural routines, which prevent societies from 
rebuilding their fixated socio-political matrix. Thus, strategic communication may 
deliver two lessons. Firstly, parties are compelled to understand the basic elements 
of the historically shaped antagonism whose transformation requires a societal level 
mutual understanding. Secondly, having reached this common emotional and 
cognitive platform, which may be ensured through a bottom-up communication 
agenda broadening the resolution actors, may create an impetus for e-motion and 
mitigate mistrust. This revision, therefore, may not only restore the majority-Other 
relations through incorporating local voices and civil society into the decision-
making mechanism but also help them finding common denominators which would 
alleviate the society’s ontological insecurities and motivate them to modify their 
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mistrustful cognitive cocoon through re-fixating interlocked Palestinian and 
mistrustful signs. Failing to accommodate these, both parties may re-start to 
perceive each other as untrustworthy or non-peaceful partners, and reapply their 
tested and proved politico-military routines, even if the public support for peaceful 
resolution attains far more support than the preceding attempts.  
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6. Concluding Discussion 
Within the bourgeoning ontological security literature, this thesis has initially 
explored the constructions of Turkish and Israeli ontological securities against the 
backdrop of their early nation-building and conflict resolution experiences. These 
experiences have long formulated their detached mindset towards minorities, thus 
stimulating the two states in pursuing harsh security cultures rather than 
implementing an accommodative approach. This study has pertinently teased out 
the adverse impacts of the ontological insecurity feelings as part of Turkey’s and 
Israel’s failed e-motion projects and has drawn attention to the alternative trust-
building framework for future resolutions.  
To briefly recapitulate, this thesis has firstly explained how different social groups 
living in these states have constructed a mistrustful cognitive cocoon in light of the 
conflicts practiced against external and internal enemies as Turkey’s and Israel’s 
nation-state structures were being established. Secondly, based on the above point, 
it has explored the underlying miscalculations of Turkey’s and Israel’s first conflict 
resolution attempts, which failed to reshape existing mistrustfulness in a viable way. 
Thirdly, it has further studied Turkey’s and Israel’s comparably successful second 
resolution attempts through strategic communication framework, striving to 
identify the plans’ shortcomings and deliver an alternative outlook for future peace 
attempts, incorporated into the ontological security lexicon. 
Theoretically speaking, minding the gap within the political science field, this thesis 
has focused on the collapsing peace initiatives of Turkey and Israel from a different 
perspective, ontological security seeking, rather than its physical pair. It has thus 
sought to grasp the neglected psychological dynamics of Turkey’s and Israel’s 
resolution processes. This setting has allowed the thesis to introduce a range of 
novel theoretical arguments within the scope of ontological security. Firstly, it has 
explored the mistrust notion, which had not received a sufficient attention within 
the ontological security literature. Secondly, it has proposed and employed an 
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innovative framework, strategic communication, exploring how this has been 
interrelated with the cognitive cocoon concept.  
Methodologically speaking, a deconstructive reading of Turkey’s and Israel’s legal 
frameworks, their national security articles and military laws shaping the very 
rationale and logic behind social and state level mistrust of the Other, has 
illuminated how early nation-building processes and experienced clashes 
underpinning these emotions have been translated into the socio-political matrix 
through fixating discursive and behavioral signs. Moreover, this way of reading has 
shed light on the relationship between Turkey’s and Israel’s siege mentalities and 
alarmist self-images, which have long limited the reflexes and conflict resolution 
methods of the Turkish and Israeli policymakers in abating turbulences with the 
Kurdish and Palestinian communities. 
Comparatively speaking, this thesis has designated Turkey’s and Israel’s several 
parallel variables and explored them in different sections as shaping of nations, 
security cultures and conflict resolution attempts. The empirical findings provided 
in these sections have demonstrated the relationship between the nation-building 
experiences and their impacts on the conflict resolution methods and processes, thus 
showing how and why the established state routines and security cultures obsoleted 
several conflict resolution attempts although both countries tried to switch their 
attitudes. Nevetheless, this thesis has also strived to explore why the Turkish and 
Israeli governments failed to remove major existential questions from the table and 
break down their behavioral routines against minorities. Such routines had not only 
been perceived as ontological insecurity sources against Turkey’s and Israel’s 
unique self-images but had also been labelled as the mistrustful Other, the 
reactionist Other, the antagonist Other, while their boundaries had been fixated out 
of Turkey’s and Israel’s value systems. 
Notwithstanding, both countries have tried to modify their mistrustful cognitive 
cocoon formation by devising two conflict resolution attempts. In their first conflict 
resolution experiences, Turkey and Israel both made major miscalculations in terms 
of their peace programs’ vague structures, abrupt implementations and top-down-
  
64 
 
orchestrated clandestine natures, which failed to reshape existing mistrust of the 
Other albeit receiving approximately 50% public support. By taking lessons from 
their mistakes, in their second attempts, they have fulfilled some premises of the 
strategic communication framework and the public support for the peaceful 
settlement increased by 30% for Turkey and 12% for Israel. As this thesis claims, 
in the case of full attachment to strategic communication in future resolution 
processes, Israel and Turkey may remove existential questions from the table more 
efficiently and mitigate ontological insecurities while reshaping their mistrustful 
cognitive cocoon. In this way, Turkey and Israel may re-fixate the psychological 
driving forces of their self-defeating behavioural routines, which prevent societies 
from rebuilding their fixated socio-political matrix.  
Reading their resolution programs through employing the strategic communication 
framework has therefore delivered several lessons for both countries. Firstly, both 
countries are obliged to grasp the basic elements of the historically-shaped 
antagonism and conflict psychology whose reconciliation is the hardest part of the 
peace processes and which require more effort than ensuring physical security. 
Secondly, they must be aware of the fact that the conflict resolution is a 
communication process, an essentially emotional one, not an event. Accordingly, it 
requires: a) a transparent and clear conflict resolution agenda, b) an engaged civil 
society motivated to incorporate locals into the decision-making process and c) to 
find common denominators to restore the majority-Other relation in rebuilding a 
shared reality, and finally, d) a socio-political commitment to reach a common 
emotional and cognitive platform which would modify the mistrustful cognitive 
cocoon and create a momentum for e-motion. Otherwise, even if their future 
resolution initiatives have received a more public support than their previous 
attempts, groups may re-start to perceive each other as untrustworthy and attach 
their politico-military agenda in line with their moral standards shaped in light of 
their tested and proved routines. 
I would like to conclude this thesis by Kinnvall and Mitzen’s argument that “the 
range of work and diversity among ontological security scholars to be exceptionally 
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productive, leading already to cross-fertilization and the deepening of our own 
approaches, while also inspiring new collaborations” (2017, p. 3). In fact, the 
employment of the theory with the help of deconstructive reading, which echoed 
my own position and preconceptions, has not only provided a new horizon in 
studying the relationship between the nation-building, security culture and conflict 
resolution triangle, but has also opened the way for emerging frameworks such as 
strategic communication to envisage further research designs within and outside the 
field. It is, therefore, recognized that within the scope of this research and purpose, 
only some aspects of the Turkey’s and Israel’s conflict resolution attempts have 
been explored. Thus, the future utilization of the theory may bring out more 
comprehensive research exploring the intertwined relationship between the 
ontological security seeking of states and societies, and the mapping of sustainable 
ways for reshaping a negative cognitive cocoon formation.  
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